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PROSECUTION AND PEACE:
A ROLE FOR AMNESTY BEFORE THE ICC?
KATE ALLAN*
INTRODUCTION
The adoption of the Statute of the International Criminal Court at the Rome
Conference was a landmark event in international law. It expressed states'
intention to cede what was guardedly reserved as a sovereign power to prosecute in
exchange for international justice and the prevention of impunity. To restrain the
International Criminal Court (ICC), states adopted complementary jurisdiction; the
ICC can only act where a state has not genuinely investigated or prosecuted
perpetrators of serious crimes, or where it is unwilling or unable to do so. 2 The
difficult question was how far should complementarity go?
It was not surprising, given divergent state practice and opinion, that a
provision on amnesties was not agreed upon.3 Some states argued that transitional
4justice mechanisms ought to be accommodated. Domestic responses to mass
atrocity or international crimes in previous years had involved a combination of
complementary processes selected from what is becoming commonly referred to as
the 'toolkit' of transitional justice.5 These multi-faceted approaches combined
limited prosecutions with truth commissions and blanket or conditional amnesties.
Other states were nevertheless steadfast in their opposition. Consequently, the
drafters of the ICC Statute left the provisions regulating jurisdiction "'creatively
ambiguous.'
6
* Associate Legal Officer at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia; L.L.M.
(Harvard); L.L.B. (QUT); B.Bus (International) (QUT). The views expressed herein are those of the
author's alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia or the United Nations in general. I am grateful to Martha Minow for her supervision
and comments on the Masters thesis upon which this article is based. All errors of fact and
interpretation are my own.
1. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Jul. 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered
into force July 1, 2002), available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/source/RecentTexts/rome-en.htm
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
2. Rome Statute, art. 17.
3. See Jessica Gavron, Amnesties in the Light of Developments in International Law and the
Establishment of the International Criminal Court, 51 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 91, 107-108 (2002); Anja
Seibert-Fohr, The Relevance of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court for Amnesties and
Truth Commissions, 7 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N.L. 553, 561 (2003).
4. Seibert-Fohr, supra note 3, at 561.
5. See, e.g., Chandra Lekha Sriram, Transitional Justice Comes of Age: Enduring Lessons and
Challenges, 23 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 506, 508 (2005).
6. Dwight G. Newman, The Rome Statute, Some Reservations Concerning Amnesties, and a
Distributive Problem, 20 AM. U. INT'L LAW REV. 293, 320-22 (2005) (quoting the Chair of the drafting
committee, Philippe Kirsch).
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This paper asks whether the ICC can, and ought to, defer to domestic grants
of amnesty. In doing so, this paper also questions more broadly whether the ICC
ought to take the impact of prosecution on peace into account. Before this article
goes on to outline the ways in which the ICC might do this, it is important to
understand: (1) the position of amnesties in international law, and (2) the forms of
amnesty that are granted and the justifications which aim to legitimize them.
In regard to the first issue, as a matter of international law, an express
customary prohibition of amnesty has not yet crystallized. There is support for
customary and treaty7 based duties to prosecute pursuant to the Geneva
Conventions (GCs), and jus cogens norms including torture, genocide. Various
judicial and UN bodies confirm that amnesties are inconsistent with treaty based
duties to prosecute.8 Exceptions can nevertheless be made. The most notable of
7. See Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment art. 7, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; International Convention on the Suppression and
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid art. 4, Nov. 30, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 243; Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 4, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 28 I.L.M.
760; see also Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field art. 49, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 50, Aug.
12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 129,
Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War art. 146, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [collectively, hereinafter the Geneva
Conventions]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 85, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter Additional Protocol I].
8. See Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, 7 153, 155-56 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998); Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Judgment, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, 165 (Jul. 29, 1988); Chumbipuma Aguirre v. Peru (Barrios Altos Case),
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75, 11 42-44 (Mar. 14, 2001); Mendoza v. Uruguay (Report
on the Situation of Human Rights in Uruguay), Inter-Am. Comm'n. H.R., Report No. 29/92,
OEA/Ser.L/VII.83, doc. 14, 77 26, 35, 50 (1993), available at http://wwwl.un.edu/humanrts/cases/
29-92-URUGUAY.htm; Consuelo et al. v. Argentina (Report on the Situation of Human Rights in
Argentina), Inter-Am. Comm'n. H.R., Report No. 28/92, OEA/Ser.LN/II.83, doc. 14, 11 32, 40, 50
(1992), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/cases/28-92-ARGENTINA.htm; Report on the
Situation of Human Rights in El Salvador, Inter-Am. Comm'n. H.R., Report No. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.85,
doc. 28 (1994), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/country-reports/elsalvadorl994.html;
X & Y v. Netherlands, App. No. 8978/80, 91 Fur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), T 27, 28 (1985); Streletz v.
Germany, 2001-11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 230, 86 (2001); Akko9 v. Turkey, 2000-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 389, 1 77
(2000); Bautista de Arellana v. Colombia, U.N. Human Rights Comm., Comm'n No. 563/1993, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/55/D/563/1993, 11 8.3, 10 (1995), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/
session55/vws56355.htm; Basilio Laureano Atachahua v. Peru, U.N. Human Rights Comm., Comm'n
No. 540/1993, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/56/D/540/1993, 10 (1996), available at http://www.unhcr.org/
refworld/docid/3ae6b70910.html. In 2010, the UN Secretary-General released a guidance note on the
UN's approach to transitional justice in which he stated that, in its transitional justice activities, the UN
should "insist[] that peace agreements not grant amnesties for war crimes, crimes against humanity,
genocide and gross violations of human rights." U.N. Secretary General, Guidance Note of the
Secretary General: United Nations Approach to the Transitional Justice, 10 (March 2010), available at
www.unrol.org/files/TJ GuidanceNoteMarch_2010FINAL.pdf. In his report to the Security Council
in 2004 on the rule of law and transitional justice and post-conflict societies, UN Secretary-General
Kofi Annan stated that "[clarefully crafted amnesties ... can never be permitted to excuse genocide,
war crimes, crimes against humanity or gross violations of human rights," and called on the
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these is Article 6(5) of Additional Protocol II to the GCs, which states that
authorities "shall endeav[o]r to grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who
have participated in the armed conflict, or those deprived of their liberty for
reasons related to the armed conflict."9 The South African Constitutional Court in
Azapo v. President of the Republic of South Africa0 relied upon Article 6(5) to
support an exception to the prohibition on amnesty.11 The explicit or constructive
duty to prosecute is nevertheless limited by subject matter and recipient, with the
obvious gaps being crimes against humanity and war crimes, which do not give
rise to grave breaches of the GCs. Customary international law established through
state practice and opinio juris may fill these gaps.12 There is an emerging state
practice supporting an obligation to prosecute the most serious violations of
international law,13 with supportive opiniojuris.14 Nevertheless, courts have been
international community to reject them. U.N. Secretary General, The Rule of Law and Transitional
Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies: Rep. of the Secretary-General to the Security Council,
32, U.N. Doc. No.S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004), available at http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/5154
000.52070618.html.
9. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 6(5), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609
[hereinafter Additional Protocol II]; see also American Convention on Human Rights art. 4(6), Nov. 22,
1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6(4), Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 (permitting amnesty to prevent imposition of the death penalty).
10. AZAPO v. President of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (4) SA 671 (CC) (S. Aft.).
11. Andreas O'Shea, Amnesty for Crime, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 50 (2002). The
Constitutional Court's reasoning was flawed because it adopted an overly broad definition of jus
cogens, applied Additional Protocol II to all other jus cogens norms and did not consider whether
amnesty for offenses that were in fact jus cogens (such as torture and genocide) was permissible. 1d.;
FAUSTIN Z. NTOUBANDI, AMNESTY FOR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
167, 171 (2007).
12. John Dugard, Possible Conflicts of Jurisdiction with Truth Commissions, in THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 696-98 (Antonio Cassese, Paola
Gaeta & John R.W.D. Jones eds., 2002).
13. Id.; O'Shea, supra note 11, at 255.
14. The Resolution on the Principles of International Cooperation in the Detection, Arrest,
Extradition, and Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity provides in
Article 4 that "[s]tates shall assist each other in detecting, arresting and bringing to trial persons
suspected of having committed... crimes and, if they are found guilty, in punishing them." G.A. Res.
3074 (XXVIII), 4, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess. Supp. No. 30, U.N. Doc. A/9030, at 79 (Dec. 3, 1973).
The Resolution adopting the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crimes and Abuse
of Power called upon states to conduct impartial investigations and prosecute persons who victimize
others by committing serious crimes or extradite such persons to another State having jurisdiction. G.A.
Res. 40/34, 4, 5, 40, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 53, U.N. Doc. A/40/53, at 213 (Nov. 29, 1985);
Question of the Punishment of War Criminals and of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes Against
Humanity, G.A. Res. 2840 (XXVI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2840 (Dec. 18, 1971); Question of the
Punishment of War Criminals and of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes Against Humanity, G.A.
Res. 2712 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2712 (Dec. 15, 1970); Question of the Punishment of War
Criminals and of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes Against Humanity, G.A. Res. 2583 (XXIV),
U.N. Doc. AIRES/2583 (Dec. 15, 1969); see also Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art.
7, Jul. 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002), available at http://treaties.
un.org/doc/source/RecentTexts/rome-en.htm; S.C. Res. 955, Statute of the International Tribunal for
Rwanda art. 3, U.N. SCO, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994); S.C. Res. 827, Statute of
the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia art. 5, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc.
2011
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reluctant to find amnesties "unlawful per se."15 While much of the debate concerns
the permissibility of conditional amnesties, 16 it is nonetheless difficult to avoid the
conclusion that while customary law had not crystallized before the Rome
Conference, international law is heading towards the prohibition of amnesties for
international crimes. 
17
Looking to the second issue, amnesties can come in a variety of forms
including blanket amnesties, self-amnesties, and conditional amnesties. However,
only conditional have attracted any real support. It is therefore only in the context
of conditional amnesties that we ought to consider whether customary international
law permits grants of amnesty. Conditional amnesties are ordinarily granted
following a determination by a quasi-judicial body, such as a truth commission,
applying legislative criteria.18 Criteria might include: whether a perpetrator acted in
pursuit of a political objective and whether he or she disclosed the truth regarding
their role and the role of others in the commission of a crime. 19 Truth commissions
gain legitimacy when they provide victims with an opportunity to participate by
confronting perpetrators, with some form of reparation, and when they have
authority to make broad findings and recommendations regarding the causes of and
events giving rise to violations. It is not amnesty itself that is justifiable, but the
process by which it is granted. Advocates of truth commissions also argue that, not
only do they have a broader mandate than domestic prosecution, they have a
greater capacity to reconcile communities and engender peace.2 0 The quintessential
example is that of South Africa, where conditional amnesty was bartered for
democratic rule, and where the South Africa Truth and Reconciliation Commission
(SATRC) was hailed as a key contributor to a relatively peaceful transition to
stable democracy.2 1 Its supporters argue that without the availability of amnesty,
South Africa might have lapsed into civil war.22 States have subsequently used this
S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993); NTOUBANDI, supra note 11, at 147-48.
15. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Amnesty and the International Criminal Court, in INTERNATIONAL
CRIMES, PEACE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 79 (Dinah
Shelton ed., 2000); John Dugard, Dealing with Crimes of a Past Regime. Is Amnesty Still an Option? 12
LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 1001, 1003 (1999); Yasmin Naqvi, Amnesty for War Crimes: Defining the Limits of
International Recognition, 85 IRRC 583, 612 (2003); Leila Nadya Sadat, Exile, Amnesty and
International Law, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 955, 1018 (2006).
16. See Dugard, supra note 15, at 1004-05; Naqvi, supra note 15, at 586-87, 624; Sadat, supra
note 15, at 1021-22. The International Court of Justice adopted the more traditional approach. Arrest
Warrant of April 11th 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Beig.), 2002 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 14) (finding that the arrest
warrant issued by Belgium against Congo's incumbent Minister of Foreign Affairs failed to respect the
immunity from criminal jurisdiction under international law); see also Newman, supra note 6, at 314;
Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior
Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2540 (1991).
17. Dugard, supra note 15, at 1004; see also Sadat, supra note 15, at 963-65, 1022-23 (agreeing
with this position).
18. Sadat, supra note 15, at 1027-28, n.343.
19. NTOUBANDI, supra note 11, at 161-162.
20. O'Shea, supra note 11, at 23-24.
21. Sadat, supra note 15, at 986.
22. See, e.g., Richard Goldstone, 1998 Otto L. Walter Lecture, International Human Rights at
Century's End, 15 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 241, 258 (1999) (noting that "amnesty was the price for a
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model to argue that amnesty can be a vital ingredient of peace negotiations because
they "stabilize and consolidate.., transition. 23
Amnesty is therefore a policy and rule of law issue. As a policy matter, it is
justified by its contribution to resolving conflict, attaining peace, and preventing
further human rights violations. As a rule of law matter, it is justified on the basis
that it is granted by a quasi-judicial body pursuant to legislation, even though
brought about by an executive act. The disentangling of law and politics however
is not so easy in the contexts in which amnesties are granted:
The construction of the transitional rule of law as independent of
politics shares certain affinities with the understanding of the rule of law
applicable in ordinary times. Yet, controversies over transitional justice
in highly politicized contexts present hard cases for adherence to the
rule of law. Despite radical political change, the aim is the rule of law
not primarily motivated by politics. Transitional jurisprudence reveals a
shining vision of the rule of law as antipolitics.
24
Policy and rule of law considerations are relevant for the ICC, particularly
given it is not limited to post bellum justice and separating law from politics is
more difficult during conflict.2 5 How then does and should the ICC respond? Does
the process by which conditional amnesties are granted satisfy due process under
international law and the ICC's admissibility requirements? Are conditional
amnesties a matter of both law and politics beyond the national realm? Or, if
amnesty is a matter of mere politics, what is the impact on prosecutorial discretion
to act?
The Rome Statute sets out the roles for the Prosecutor, the Security Council,
and the Pre-Trial Chamber in determining whether the ICC can exercise
jurisdiction over a matter.26 The Prosecutor plays a lead role because he has
27discretion to determine whether to proceed with an investigation or prosecution.
The Prosecutor has two avenues to defer to conditional amnesty. First, he can
determine that amnesties satisfy the admissibility requirements of Article 17.28
Second, pursuant to Article 53, he can determine that it is not in the interests of
justice to proceed with an investigation or prosecution where an amnesty has been
or might be granted.29
ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo has been patently clear about his
approach to admissibility and the interests of justice. In regard to admissibility, he
peaceful transition from apartheid to democracy").
23. RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 54 (2000).
24. Id. at21-22.
25. Rosanna Lipscomb, Restructuring the ICC Framework to Advance Transitional Justice: A
Search for a Permanent Solution in Sudan, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 182, 189-93 (2006).
26. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, arts. 13-18, Jul. 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
(entered into force July 1, 2002), available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/source/RecentTexts/rome-
en.htm [hereinafter Rome Statute].
27. For ease of reference this paper adopts the Prosecutor's current gender throughout.
28. Rome Statute, art. 17.
29. Rome Statute, art. 53.
2011
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stated in a report to the Security Council that alternative justice mechanisms "are
not criminal proceedings as such for the purpose of assessing the admissibility of
cases before the [ICC], but they are an important part of the fabric of reconciliation
for Darfur, as recognized in resolution 1593 (2005).,, 30 Even where amnesty is
granted by quasi-judicial bodies such as the SATRC, Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo
would not find that they are determinative of admissibility under Article 17 of the
Rome Statute. While he seemed to leave open the question of whether amnesties
might be in the interests of justice because of their reconciliatory capacity, he
foreclosed this possibility in September 2007 when he released a policy paper on
the interests of justice. 31 In that paper, he notes that justice and peace are not
mutually exclusive,32 and in dealing with the intersection of justice, peace, and
security, he will work with other institutions such as the Security Council.33 He
further stated that while Security Council intervention would not presuppose the
Prosecutor's position on the interests of justice, he will adopt "a presumption in
[favor] of investigation or prosecution" and use his discretion only in exceptional
circumstances.34 In case of any doubt regarding his position on amnesties, the
paper footnotes a quote from the Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs and
United Nations Legal Counsel, who said "[j]ustice should never be sacrificed by
granting amnesty in ending conflicts. 35
Should the Prosecutor exercise unfettered discretion to determine
admissibility and the interests of justice, we might then end the discussion here.
However, Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo's paper is a policy document and not
binding for the purposes of judicial review, 36 and could be amended by the next
appointee.37 While the object of preventing serious crimes through ending
impunity is likely to continue to play a decisive role, it is possible that time and
progressive development of the law may lead the Prosecutor to favor peace and
security in certain circumstances. Moreover, the Prosecutor is subject to Security
Council and Pre-Trial Chamber oversight. The Security Council has the power to
issue a resolution referring a matter to the Prosecutor or requesting that the ICC
defer an investigation or prosecution of a matter where it is a threat to international
peace or security. 38 The Pre-Trial Chamber has authority to review the
Prosecutor's decision to proceed (although it might adopt a less intrusive role
regarding policy matters). 39 Neither the Security Council nor the Pre-Trial
30. U.N. S.C. Rep. of the Secretary-General on the Sudan, 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 5459, U.N. SCOR
5459th mtg (Jun. 14, 2009), available at http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=S/PV.5459.
31. International Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice
(Sept. 2007), available at http://www2.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/772C95C9-F54D-4321-BF09-
73422BB23528/143640/ICCOTPInterestsOflustice.pdf [hereinafter OTP Policy Paper].
32. Id. at 8.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1, 3.
35. Id. at 3.
36. Jens David Ohlin, Peace, Security and Prosecutorial Discretion, in THE EMERGING PRACTICE
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, 251, 263 (Carsten Stahn & Goran Sluiter eds., 2009).
37. See id. at 259 (noting that the Assembly is charged with electing a Prosecutor).
38. Id. at 250.
39. Id. at 264.
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Chamber have intervened on the basis of amnesty as of yet. Whether amnesty
might be accommodated is, therefore, still open to debate.
There are two approaches that may be adopted by each of these bodies. The
Prosecutor and the Pre-Trial Chamber can adopt a restrictive approach. With
regard to admissibility, truth commissions would fail to satisfy the requirements of
"criminal justice, '40 and amnesty would indicate an unwillingness or inability to
prosecute. The President of the International Crisis Group, Gareth Evans, aptly
summarized the restrictive approach with regard to the interests ofjustice:
I have no doubt that dealing with impunity and pursuing peace can work
in tandem even in an ongoing conflict situation: these are not
necessarily incompatible objectives. The prosecutor's job is to prosecute
and he should get on with it with bulldog intensity. If a policy decision
needs to be made, in a particular case, to give primacy to peace, it
should be made not by those with the justice mandate, but with the
political and conflict resolution mandate, and that is the Security
Council. The Statute allows for this in Article 16, and this is the way the
international community should be thinking about it.
41
According to this approach, the ICC prioritizes its prosecutorial mandate and
policy issues remain a matter for the Security Council.
Alternatively, the Prosecutor and the Pre-Trial Chamber can adopt an
expansive view, where the process by which amnesty is granted satisfies the
requirements of admissibility, and/or the interests of justice accommodate legal,
political, and social issues. 42 The expansive approach allows the Prosecutor and
Court to consider whether prosecution may prevent the conclusion of peace
negotiations by deterring perpetrators from engaging in actions that might lead to
their disarmament and arrest, and whether prosecution at the post-conflict stage
may lead to the resumption of hostilities.43
Literature following the ratification of the Rome Statute adopted positions
ranging from a narrow application of the law and confinement to prosecutorial
criminal justice mechanisms 44 to expansive policy approaches, which argue that
the Prosecutor could decline jurisdiction "where prosecution is likely to have
[destabilizing] effects on the state which has granted the amnesty. '45 This paper
builds upon that body of literature in two ways. First, it synthesizes the positions
put forward by scholars and practitioners and frames them in terms of the
40. OTP's Second Public Hearing: Looking Ahead, NEWSLETTER (ICC, THE HAGUE), Oct. 2006,
at 5, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/A553E1FB-3662-497E-B06E-5B089B22D0
1B/278464/ICCNL9200610_En.pdf [hereinafter OTP's Newsletter].
41. Id.; see also Kenneth Roth, Discussion, The International Criminal Court Five Years on;
Progress or Stagnation?, 6 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 763, 765 (2008) (agreeing with the ICC's approach in
prioritizing its prosecutorial mandate).
42. Diba Majzub, Peace or Justice? Amnesties and the International Criminal Court, 3 MELB. J.
OF INT'L L. 247, 275-78 (2002).
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., Roth, supra note 41, at 765-66.
45. Majzub, supra note 42, at 272.
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restrictive or expansive approach. Second, it applies these approaches to the
situations of Uganda and Darfur, which are currently subject to ICC jurisdiction.
Over the last few years, events in these countries and state responses to
intervention by the ICC have altered the way in which one might view the role of
the ICC. In Uganda, ICC intervention has led to attempts by the government to
establish domestic criminal justice mechanisms that incorporate criminal
prosecution, reparations, and reconciliatory mechanisms.46 In Darfur, ICC arrest
warrants for President Omar al-Bashir and other political leaders resulted in the
expulsion of humanitarian aid groups and the withdrawal of some United Nations
peacekeepers. 47 Much of the scholarly debate regarding amnesties and the ICC pre-
dated the Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo's policy, and subsequent reactions were
few. As a result, the key contribution of this paper to that debate is its application
of the synthesized debate to recent events in states subject to ICC jurisdiction. It
determines whether, in the context of present circumstances in Uganda and Sudan,
the Court should, or has scope to, take into account political factors.
The paper will be structured as follows. Part I will discuss the Prosecutor's
application of the provisions regarding admissibility and the interests of justice to
determine whether, prima facie, a restrictive or expansive approach may be
applied. It will then go on to discuss the role of the Security Council and the Pre-
Trial Chamber. Part II will discuss four case studies: Darfur, Uganda, Sierra
Leone, and South Africa. Uganda is the only situation currently subject to ICC
jurisdiction that provides an example of the intersection of domestic amnesty and
international prosecution. While Sudan has not granted amnesties for the conflict
in Darfur, the case study is useful because it provides insight into the role of the
Security Council in maintaining international peace and security. The case studies
of Sierra Leone and South Africa are pertinent because they granted amnesties
(blanket and conditional respectively), established truth commissions, and
conducted prosecutions, and they inform the extent to which amnesty may be
desirable as a policy matter.41 Part III will apply the findings of Parts I-I to the
restrictive and expansive approaches. The key finding of this paper is that the
restrictive approach should be adopted for both legal and policy reasons.
I. THE ROME STATUTE
A situation can fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC in one of three ways: (1)
referral by a state party; (2) referral by the Security Council using its Chapter VII
powers;49 or (3) a propio motu investigation by the Prosecutor.50 Even where a
matter has been referred, prosecutorial discretion to investigate and prosecute is
regulated by Article 53 of the Rome Statute. Article 53 provides that the
46. See Roth, supra note 41, at 765-66.
47. Wairagala Wakabi, Aid Expulsion Leaves Huge Gap in Darfur's Health Services, 373 LANCET
1068, 1068-69 (2009).
48. The models adopted by South Africa and Sierra Leone will also be considered in Parts I and II.
49. See U.N. Charter Chapter VII.
50. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 13(c), Jul. 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
(entered into force July 1, 2002), available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/source/RecentTexts/rome-
en.htm [hereinafter Rome Statute].
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Prosecutor shall consider: (1) whether he has sufficient factual evidence to support
a reasonable basis for investigation or sufficient basis for an arrest warrant or
summons,51 (2) whether a matter is admissible in terms of article 17,52 or (3)
whether it is in the interests of justice to proceed.53 For our purposes, admissibility
and the interests of justice are determinative. Before proceeding to discuss these
provisions, regard ought to be had to the objects and purposes of the Rome Statute.
A. Object and purpose of the Rome Statute
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (the Vienna Convention)
provides that a "treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to [its] terms... and in the light of its object and
purpose, 54 having regard to inter alia its preamble. If the application of
interpretive guides leads to a meaning that is ambiguous or obscure, or a result
manifestly absurd or unreasonable, regard may be had to supplementary means
including preparatory work and the circumstances of the treaty's conclusion.56
Preamble
The preamble provides that the Rome Statute:
Affirm[s] that the most serious crimes of concern to the international
community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective
prosecution must be ensured[,]... [r]ecall[s] that it is the duty of every
state to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for
international crimes,... [and] [e]mphasiz[es] that the [ICC] established
under [the] Statute shall be complementary to national criminal. . 57
jurisdictions.
Notable phrases include that the most serious crimes "must not go
unpunished" and that their "effective prosecution" must be ensured, as well as that
it is a "duty" of states to exercise "criminal prosecution" to which the ICC shall be
complementary. These objects must underscore the interpretation of provisions
even where they are unambiguous. It is important to bear in mind, however, that
the preamble and the procedural provisions (i.e. Articles 16, 17 and 53) were
drafted by different committees within the conference which did not interact, and
that there was little effort to make these sections of the Statute consistent.
5
51. Id. at arts. 53(1)(a), (2)(a).
52. Id. at arts. 53(1)(b), (2)(b).
53. Id. at arts. 53(1)(c), (2)(c).
54. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
[hereinafter Vienna Convention]; see also JEFFREY L. DUNOFF, STEVEN R. RATNER & DAVID
WIPPMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: NoRMS, ACTORS, PROCESS 39 (Aspen Pub., 2002) (noting the Vienna
Convention is accepted as customary international law).
55. Rome Statute, art. 31(2)-(3). The latter of these was discussed.
56. Id. at art. 32.
57. Rome Statute, pmbl.
58. Sharon A. Williams & William A. Schabas, Article 17, Issues of Admissibility, in
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS'
NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 605, 611 (2d ed. 2008); Michael P. Scharf, From the Exile Files: An
Essay on Trading Justice for Peace, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 339, 368 (2006).
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Travaux Pr~paratoires
The issue of amnesties was "acutely controversial" in the debate over
jurisdiction at the Rome Conference.5 9 The United States advocated for amnesties
by circulating a non-paper, which argued "that a decision by a democratic regime
to grant an amnesty should be a consideration in determining the admissibility of a
case before the ICC. '60 Some states, such as South Africa and Colombia, claimed
that they reserved the right to grant amnesty in appropriate circumstances.61 The
treaty prohibited reservations so Colombia, which had considered granting
amnesties and pardons to bring an end to decades of armed conflict,62 entered its
ratification with the following interpretive declaration:
None of the provisions of the Rome Statute concerning the exercise of
jurisdiction by the [ICC] prevent the Colombian State from granting
amnesties, reprieves or judicial pardons for political crimes, provided
that they are granted in conformity with the Constitution and with the
principles and norms of international law accepted by Colombia.
63
Whether interpretive declarations are binding depends upon a complex and
often indeterminate examination of whether the declaration is, in effect, a
reservation that is inconsistent with the object and purpose of the treaty and
whether other ratifying states object. 64 As far as it is possible to ascertain, no states
objected on this basis. Even so, the declaration is not necessarily determinative of
the treaty's interpretation for all parties.
Nevertheless, there are two ways in which the omission of a provision on
amnesty could be read. The absence of an explicit prohibition could indicate that
amnesties are permissible under Article 17.65 Whether or not participating states
concurred that amnesty should be permitted may depend upon distinguishing
66unconditional from conditional amnesties. On the other hand, it could indicate
59. See Sharon A. Williams, The Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court: From 1947-
2000 and Beyond, 38 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 297, 328 (2000); see also Williams & Schabas, supra note
58, at 611.
60. Majzub, supra note 42, at 268.
61. Newman, supra note 6, at 318-28.
62. Id. at 326. Newman notes that "Colombia's ratification of the Rome Statute, absent its
interpretive declaration, might have foreclosed the government's ability to offer immunity in exchange
for peace, thereby removing any incentive for armed rebels to negotiate a truce." Id. at 326-27.
63. Id. at 325.
64. SEAN D. MURPHY, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 74 (2006); HENRY STEINER, PHILLIP
ALSTON, & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS,
MORALS 1143-50 (3rd ed., 2008).
65. See lain Cameron, Jurisdiction and Admissibility Issues under the ICC Statute, in THE
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 90-91 (Dominic
McGoldrick, Peter Rowe, & Eric Donnelly eds., 2004); Darryl Robinson, Serving the Interests of
Justice: Amnesties, Truth Commissions and the International Criminal Court, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 481,
499 (2003).
66. In 2000, the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan stated that "[n]o one should imagine that [the
Rome Statute] would apply to a case like South Africa's, where the regime and the conflict which
caused the crimes have come to an end, and the victims have inherited power." Charles Villa-Vicencio,
Why Perpetrators Should Not Always Be Prosecuted- Where the International Criminal Court and
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they have no jurisdictional impact. Neither approach appears to be appropriate.
According to the Chairman of the Committee of the Diplomatic Conference, the
question was deliberately undecided.68 The travauxpriparatoires might then be of
little assistance, other than to confirm no state consensus exists and, therefore, no
customary rule.
B. The Prosecutor
Before engaging in an analysis of admissibility and the interests of justice, it
is important to note that the Prosecutor may exercise jurisdiction over an individual
even where a domestic court is prosecuting him. The Pre-Trial Chamber held that
"for a case arising from the investigation of a situation to be inadmissible, national
proceedings must encompass both the person and the conduct which is the subject
of the case before the Court., 6 9 Accordingly, in the case against Thomas Lubanga,
the Court deemed the case admissible because he had not been charged with all
crimes for which he could be accused.70  The ICC's holding may have
consequences for conditional amnesties. The SATRC allocated hearings by victim
rather than perpetrator.7 1 Perpetrators of numerous violations were only granted
amnesty for conduct that would not necessarily encompass all acts that give rise to
liability.7 2 The jurisdiction of truth commissions might mean perpetrators are only
granted amnesty for some but not all conduct (whether through rejection or
through a perpetrator's omission in disclosing conduct in their application). In
principle, in a way similar to the Lubanga case, the Court and Prosecutor might
therefore exercise jurisdiction over an individual subject to amnesty for conduct
that was not subject to an investigation or grant of amnesty by the SATRC.73
1. Admissibility
Article 17 of the Rome Statute sets out the test for admissibility. It provides
that the Court, with regards to paragraph 10 of the Preamble and Article 1, shall
Truth Commissions Meet, 49 EMORY L.J. 205, 222 (2000).
67. Dugard, supra note 12, at 701.
68. Newman, supra note 6, at 320-2 1, n.123.
69. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-8, Decision on the
Prosecutor's Application for a Warrant of Arrest, 37 (Feb. 10, 2006); see also Prosecutor v Ahman
Harun & Ali Kushayb, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/07, Decision on the Prosecution Application under
Article 58(7) of the Statute, 24 (Apr. 27, 2007).
70. See Jennifer Easterday, The Case Against Lubanga So Far, THE LUBANGA TRIAL AT THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (Aug. 17, 2009), http://www.lubangatrial.org/2009/08/17/the-case-
against-lubanga-so-far/.
71. See ANDREW WOOLFORD & R.S. RATNER, INFORMAL RECKONINGS: CONFLICT RESOLUTION
IN MEDIATION, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND REPARATIONS 99 (2008) (claiming that separate hearings
were held for apartheid victims, and these hearings have led commentators to deem the SATRC as
victim centered justice).
72. See id (positing that perpetrators are held accountable through the SATRC to the extent that
they must stand before the committee and tell the full truth about their involvement in politically
motivated crime; remorse and regret are not necessary, as perpetrators are only required to tell the
truth).
73. This approach could attest to the additional criteria of "inactive." Williams & Schabas, supra
note 58, at 616. Should this be correct, it would be even more unlikely that it would defer to a
conditional amnesty that did not encompass all conduct for which a perpetrator may be charged.
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determine that a case is inadmissible: (a) where it is being investigated or
prosecuted by the referring or affected state; (b) where that state has investigated
the matter and decided not to proceed with prosecution, unless the state is
unwilling or unable to genuinely investigate or prosecute;74 or (c) where a person
has been tried by another court for crimes falling within the Court's jurisdiction,
unless the proceedings in the other court were, (i) for the purpose of shielding the
person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of
the Court, or (ii) otherwise not conducted independently or impartially in
accordance with the norms of due process recognized by international law and
conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, was inconsistent with an intent
to bring the person concerned to justice. 75 While the provision is directed at the
Court, the Prosecutor must have regard to admissibility pursuant to Article 53.76 To
determine whether amnesties and truth commissions prevent the prosecutor from
exercising jurisdiction, it is necessary to determine whether the procedure for
granting amnesty falls within the ambit of "investigation," "decision," "trial,"
"court," "independent and impartial," and "unwilling or unable. 77
a. Investigation and Decision: Article 17()(a) and (b)
The requirement to investigate is found in of Article 17(1)(a) and (b). The
preamble and Article 1, which refer to "criminal jurisdiction," infer that
investigation means criminal investigation.78 Sub-paragraph (a) itself refers to
"criminal responsibility," and sub-paragraph (b) refers to the "intent to bring the
person to justice.' 79 Sub-paragraph (a) also requires "the case" to be investigated.80
The provision impliedly contemplates criminal investigations.81
By adopting an expansive approach, institutions granting conditional
amnesties, such as the SATRC, might satisfy the requirements of "investigation"
and "case" where they engage in "good-faith, methodological evidence
74. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 17(1)(c), Jul. 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
90 (entered into force July 1, 2002), available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/source/RecentTexts/rome-
en.htm [hereinafter Rome Statute]. The court may also determine that the matter is not of sufficient
gravity. This will be considered under the interests of justice. Id.
75. Id. at arts. 17(1)(c), 20(3).
76. A referring state may only challenge a Prosecutor's decision not to proceed with an
investigation or prosecution on the basis of article 53(1) and (2) (to be dealt with later). Rome Statute,
art. 53(1)-(4).
77. Id at art. 15(1)-(6); see also Id. at art. 53(1)-(4).
78. Rome Statute, pmbl. ("The States Party to this Statute, . . . recall[] that it is a duty of every
State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes.").
79. Id. at art. 17(1).
80. Id. at art. 17(1)(a). An unconditional amnesty, such as in Uganda, would fail that test because
the decision to prosecute does not involve or follow an investigation at all. See Cameron, supra note 65,
at 91; MURPHY, supra note 64, at 146; Robinson, supra note 65, at 499; Siebert-Fohr, supra note 3, at
564-65.
81. John T. Holmes, Complementarity: National Courts versus the ICC, in THE ROME STATUTE
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 667, 674 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds.,
2002); Majzub, supra note 42, at 270; but see Siebert-Fohr, supra note 3, at 569 (discussing the
interpretation of the Rome Statute, arts. 17(1) and (2), and how the interpretation of paragraph 2 to
require "criminal investigation" goes beyond the scope of the paragraph).
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gathering" 82 of facts, to make an objective determination of criminal liability in
individual cases. 83 The SATRC operated as a quasi-judicial body,84 because it
conducted investigations through expansive powers of search and seizure, 85 and
could subpoena the provision of information or attendance by any person and
question such persons in public or in camera hearings.86 Victims and amnesty
applicants were entitled to be present at committee hearings with exception 87 and
cross-examine witnesses, 88 and persons questioned were entitled to legal
representation (albeit without a right to freedom from self-incrimination and a
presumption of innocence). 89 Following a hearing, the Amnesty Committee
provided written reasons for its decision regarding whether a perpetrator of human
rights violations was granted amnesty.90 Such institutions may also satisfy
"criminal jurisdiction" by the mere fact of their jurisdiction over crimes and
"criminal responsibility" where perpetrators were brought to account through
submitting to the jurisdiction of the institution, facing victims, truth telling, and
providing reparation. Moreover, recognizing "decisions" for individualized
amnesties might be consistent with the references to "the case" and "person" in the
provision, which suggests individual decisions are required.91
This approach could be adopted if the distinction between investigation or
prosecution in Article 17(1)(a) and (b) accepts that an investigation can be
conducted irrespective of the body that conducts it,92 and irrespective of its
purpose.93 However, according to the rules of statutory interpretation, Articles
17(1)(a) and (b) must be read together. 94 Sub-paragraph (a) protects matters that
82. See MURPHY, supra note 64, at 427 (discussing how a state that is willing and genuinely able
to carry out an investigation will preclude ICC jurisdiction).
83. BRUCE BROOMHALL, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
BETWEEN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE RULE OF LAW 101 (Ian Brownlie & Vaughn Lowe eds., 2003); see
also Robinson, supra note 65, at 499-500 (explaining that the court can adopt a broader approach and
deem that "investigation" encompasses diligence, methodological effort to retrieve evidence, and
ascertain facts in order to make an objective determination pursuant to pertinent criteria).
84. Gavron, supra note 3, at 114.
85. Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act No. 34 of 1995 Ch. 6 art. 32, (S. Aft.),
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/world/rsa/act95_034.htm
86. Id at art. 29.
87. Id. at arts. 29, 33 (explaining that no person other than a member of the staff of the
Commission or a person subpoenaed may attend any investigation, however, hearings of the
Commission are open to the public unless an informed decision is made to hold the hearing behind
closed doors).
88. Id. at art. 34.
89. Idat art. 31.
90. Id. at arts. 20-21.
91. Cameron, supra note 65, at 91.
92. Jennifer Llewellyn, A Comment on the Complementarity Jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court: Adding Insult to Injury in Transitional Justice Contexts?, 24 DALHOUSIE L.J. 192, 203
(2001).
93. Id. at 203; Carsten Staln, Complementarity, Amnesties and Alternative Forms of Justice:
Some Interpretive Guidelines for the International Criminal Court, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 695, 711
(2005).
94. Llewellyn, supra note 92, at 203.
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are in the preliminary phase of sub-paragraph (b),9 5 i.e. where a decision not to
prosecute has not yet been taken. The duty to prosecute is inextricably linked to
"the triad of obligations - investigate, take action against those responsible, and
provide redress," which "suggests that prosecution is thought necessary in order to
fulfill the other two obligations in the triad., 96 An investigation and decision might
be sufficient provided prosecution was one of the possible options for achieving
justice; investigation must at least contemplate prosecution.97 The provision cannot
incorporate an investigation whose principle objective is to determine whether
amnesty should be granted. The same principles might be applied to interpreting
"decision," such that individualized decisions must be considered in terms of their
purpose.
The SATRC conducted a broad range of investigations propio motu and upon
application for amnesty. 98 Investigations connected to grants of amnesty would
have been made upon an application and were, therefore, for the purpose of
determining whether amnesty ought to be granted.99 While denials of amnesty left
the possibility of prosecution open,1°° SATRC investigations did not contemplate
prosecution, rather, they contemplated amnesty.101 The final outcome was a
decision rejecting the amnesty application and possibly a recommendation (but not
a decision) to prosecute, 10 2 but the exercise of jurisdiction precluded even the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion. The National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) did
not retain any discretion to determine whether or not to prosecute until the SATRC
had made its decision. 1°3 Along a procedural spectrum, it is pre-investigation and
would only have an impact upon the decision to prosecute if an amnesty arose
from it. Whether a prosecution would occur following a rejection of amnesty was a
matter for an entirely new investigation because of the restrictions on using
evidence gathered during SATRC investigations in subsequent prosecutions. 10 4 If
the SATRC type process was accommodated, a state could argue that it is
investigating a matter with a view to granting amnesty rather than prosecuting,
before an investigation regarding whether or not to prosecute has even occurred.
Upon these grounds, a more restrictive approach is warranted.
95. See id. (explaining that paragraph (b) expressly discusses situations where investigations have
been conducted and the State has decided not to prosecute, and the meaning of this Paragraph is
dependent on Paragraph (a) which deems cases inadmissible if there is an investigation or prosecution).
96. Id. at 208.
97. Robinson, supra note 65, at 500.
98. See DRAZAN DIUKIC, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND THE ICC: IN THE "INTERESTS OF JUSTICE"?
22 (2006), available at http://www.prix-henry-dunant.org/sites/prixhd/doc/2007_DrazanDjukic.pdf
99. Llewellyn, supra note 92, at 210-11.
100. Stahn, supra note 93, at 711-12.
101. See Seibert-Fohr, supra note 3, at 568 (claiming that the Rome Statute would permit case-by-
case investigations, such as those done in South Africa, which result in an individualized grant of
criminal impunity if offenders truthfully admit their wrongdoings).
102. Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act No. 34 of 1995 Ch. 6 art. 21, (S. Aft.),
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/world/rsa/act95 034.htm [hereinafter the SATRC Act]
103. See NPA Prosecution Policy for Apartheid Crimes Struck Down, ALLAFRICA.COM (Dec. 12,
2008), http://allafrica.com/stories/200812120792.html.
104. SATRC Act art. 31.
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The South African example is complicated by the NPA's recent prosecution
guidelines, which permit executive and prosecutorial grants of amnesty.10 5 The
guidelines allow perpetrators to apply for amnesty pursuant to conditions that are
substantially similar to those applied by the SATRC, but which include additional
factors such as whether the NPA has the resources to investigate and prosecute the
matter.106 An overly expansive construction of the term accommodating a broad
executive decision would clearly be contrary to the objective of the Statute.107
However, investigations conducted prior to grants of amnesty in such a case may
not contemplate amnesty, because a grant of amnesty may be considered by the
Minister of Justice following the NPA's investigation or upon the application of
the accused.108 An investigation may then still be conducted for the purpose of
prosecution. Should a state incorporate amnesty decisions within the role of its
NPA, such that amnesty might be an exception to the primary goal of prosecution,
Article 17(1)(a) and (b) might be satisfied. This might even be the case where an
application was made by a perpetrator prior to an investigation, if an investigation
is nevertheless conducted. However, if the application is considered on its merits
without investigation, the Prosecutor will be put in the same position as the TRC;
the determination would first be whether amnesty should be granted. The existence
of the amnesty policy would negate an expansive approach. Whether the guidelines
withstand Article 17 is nevertheless determined by their expression of willingness.
b. Unwilling: Article 17(1) and (2)
Article 17(2) gives meaning to the term unwilling in Article 17(1)(a) and (b)
by providing that the Court must consider the following: (1) whether a national
decision was made for the purpose of shielding a person from criminal
responsibility, (2) whether there has been an unjustified delay in proceedings
which is inconsistent with an intent to bring a person to justice, and (3) whether the
proceedings were not conducted independently or impartially but in a way
inconsistent with an intent to bring a person to justice. 10 9 In interpreting the
provision, the Prosecutor must consider the principles of due process recognized
by international law. 110 An investigation and prosecution must be conducted
genuinely,111 and a judicial decision made, with a view to making a person
criminally responsible. 112 The provision was inserted following consensus that it
was necessary to "refute the presumption that a national system was handling the
105. President's Message to the National House of Parliament and the Nation on the Prosecution
Policy and Directives Relating to Prosecution of Criminal Matters Arising From Conflicts of the Past,
app. A, 22 (Dec. 1, 2005) (S. Aft), available at http://us-cdn.creamermedia.co.za/assets/
articles/attachments/02475_npaprosecutionpolicy.pdf [hereinafter NPA Prosecution Policy]
106. Id; see also ALLAFRICA.COM, supra note 103.
107. Robinson, supra note 65, at 496-97.
108. NPA Prosecution Policy, supra note 105, at 24.
109. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 17(2), Jul. 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
(entered into force July 1, 2002), available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/source/RecentTexts/rome-
en.htm [hereinafter Rome Statute].
110. Id.
111. Rome Statute, art. 17 (1)(a)-(b).
112. Rome Statute, art. 25(3).
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case in an adequate manner," so that states could not "easily prevent the ICC from
taking jurisdiction by initiating an investigation or prosecution."113 Some posit that
the underlying purpose of the qualification is to filter bona fide from mala fide
state conduct 1 4 However the provision could be read more broadly, because even
if a state subjectively demonstrates good faith, it may be objectively unable to
achieve impartial and independent results through investigation or prosecution.
115
The requirement of "genuineness" in sub-paragraphs (1)(a) and (b) supports a
broader reading.
1 16
In order to determine whether a truth commission's grant of amnesty satisfies
the qualification we must determine whether it "shields" a person. 117 An expansive
approach requires the Prosecutor to demonstrate "a devious intent on the part of a
State, contrary to its apparent actions." '118 The restrictive approach requires that
shielding "must be an intended consequence [of the amnesty], whether or not there
is a primary, greater intention." 119 The former position might be satisfied where an
outgoing regime negotiates an amnesty, even conditional. Siebert-Fohr argues that
a truth commission established to serve peace and security would demonstrate
willingness because accountability may also be realized by non-judicial efforts
even if they fall short of criminal prosecution. 12 This approach is flawed because
the preamble calls precisely for criminal prosecution. There are other cogent
reasons supporting this approach, the most compelling of which is that upon a
broader approach the Pre-Trial Chamber is required to "pass judgment on the long-
term political goals of a State," 121 a decision which is not only highly difficult to
make but beyond the authority of the Court.
In any event, it seems unnecessary to engage in this analysis because the
ordinary meaning of the words is clear: the effective provision requires a
willingness to investigate or to prosecute. 122 The grant of amnesty must ultimately
fail at the prosecution stage even if it doesn't at the investigation stage because
113. Williams &. Schabas, supra note 58, at 610.
114. Claudia Angermaier, The ICC and Amnesty: Can the Court Accommodate a Model of
Restorative Justice?, 1 EYES ON THE ICC 131, 144-45 (2004).
115. Holmes, supra note 81, at 674; see also Gavron, supra note 3, at 111 (submitting that the
qualification imports a subjective element, as it is still necessary to first consider whether the state had
the intention of bringing the person to justice or whether it intended to shield them from prosecution or
fair punishment).
116. Gavron, supra note 3, at 110-11.
117. Rome Statute, art. 17(2)(a).
118. Louise Arbour & Morten Bergsmo, Conspicuous Absence of Jurisdictional Overreach, in
REFLECTIONS ON THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ADRAAN Bos 67
(Herman H.A. von Hebel, Johan G. Lammers & Jolien Schukking eds., 1999).
119. Gavron, supra note 3, at 111; see also Sang Wook Daniel Han, The International Criminal
Court and National Amnesty, 12 AUCKLAND U. L. REV. 97, 99 (2006); Roht-Arriaza, supra note 15, at
79.
120. Siebert-Fohr, supra note 3, at 571.
121. Helmut Gropengieller & Jirg Meillner, Amnesties and the Rome Statute, in 2 ESSAYS ON THE
ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 171, 185 (Flavia Lattanzi & William A.
Schabas eds., 2004).
122. Rome Statute, art. 17(1)(a)-(b).
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amnesty shields a person from prosecution. One might then conclude that the
intent to bring a person to justice requires a person to be investigated and, where
appropriate, prosecuted. Even adopting the latter approach means that an amnesty,
adopted with legitimate intent such as the "pacification and reconciliation of a
society" will by default adopt the goal of shielding.123 This is supported by the
Inter-American Court on Human Rights, which found that national reconciliation
is insufficient to make amnesties lawful. 124 Consequently, South Africa's "wider
policy to restore social peace and reconciliation after a period of transition" 
1 25
would not make an investigation or prosecution inadmissible. As will be further
discussed in Part II of this article, amnesties granted by Uganda and Sierra
Leone126 would also fail the test of admissibility because their by-product is
impunity from criminal responsibility. In the context of Uganda, MacMillan argues
that it is possible to find in the present circumstances that the Amnesty Act 2000
does not shield persons from prosecution because it is used in context of a multi-
pronged approach to accountability which incorporates domestic prosecutions and
traditional justice mechanisms. 27 As with the South African situation, the decisive
issue, however, is whether the amnesty shields the individual; the overall approach
is not assessed. Even if the State seeks in good faith to achieve other legitimate
goals, the foreseeable consequence of shielding can be nothing other than
intentional. If we apply this reasoning to the terms "investigation," "prosecution,"
and "decision," an investigation conducted by a body such as a truth commission is
not sufficient. To hold otherwise would mean that the Prosecutor is prevented from
investigating a case where a state was investigating for the purposes of an amnesty
123. GropengieBer & MeiBner, supra note 121, at 185.
124. See Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, 7 153, 155-56 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998); Velsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Judgment, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, 1 165 (Jul. 29, 1988); Chumbipuma Aguirre v. Peru (Barrios Altos Case),
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75, 7 42-44 (Mar. 14, 2001); Mendoza v. Uruguay (Report
on the Situation of Human Rights in Uruguay), Inter-Am. Comm'n. H.R., Report No. 29/92,
OEA/Ser.L/VII.83, doc. 14, 26, 35, 50 (1993), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/cases/
29-92-URUGUAY.htm; Consuelo et al. v. Argentina (Report on the Situation of Human Rights in
Argentina), Inter-Am. Comm'n. H.R., Report No. 28/92, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.83, doc. 14, 11 32, 40, 50
(1992), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/cases/28-92-ARGENTINA.htm; Report on the
Situation of Human Rights in El Salvador, Inter-Am. Comm'n. H.R., Report No. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.85,
doc. 28 (1994), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/country-reports/elsalvadorl994.html;
X & Y v. Netherlands, App. No. 8978/80, 91 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), 27, 28 (1985); Streletz v.
Germany, 2001-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 230, T 86 (2001); Akkog v. Turkey, 2000-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 389, 77
(2000); Bautista de Arellana v. Colombia, U.N. Human Rights Comm., Comm'n No. 563/1993, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/55/D/563/1993, 11 8.3, 10 (1995), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/
session55/vws56355.htm; Basilio Laureano Atachahua v. Peru, U.N. Human Rights Comm., Comm'n
No. 540/1993, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/56/D/540/1993, 10 (1996), available at http://www.unhcr.org/
refworld/docid/3ae6b70910.html.
125. Christine Van den Wyngaert & Tom Ongena, Ne bis in idem Principle, Including the Issue of
Amnesty, in 1 THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 705,
727 (Antonio Cassese et al eds., 2002).
126. Kathleen Ellen MacMillan, The Practicability of Amnesty as a Non-Prosecutory Alternative in
Post-Conflict Uganda, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 199, 204-205, 224 (2007).
127. Id. at 231-32.
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determination, but would assume jurisdiction once the investigation was complete
and amnesty was granted.
What forecloses the ability of a grant of amnesty by a truth commission to
satisfy willingness is the extent to which it hinges on what "justice" means. An
expansive approach incorporates restorative justice, while the restrictive approach
is limited to retributive. We might find the answer in the principles of due process
recognized by international law, and the objects and purposes of the Statute. While
a conditional grant of amnesty requires a person to take responsibility through
confession, disclosure of the truth, an apology, or financial compensation,1 28 these
do not import criminal responsibility because our traditional understanding of
criminal responsibility entails punishment through imprisonment, community
service, and/or fines. 129 If due process includes procedural as well as substantive
fairness, 13 punishment is a component of due process recognized by international
law. This approach is supported by the preamble, which states that the most serious
crimes of concern must not go "unpunished." '131 Restorative justice cannot not be a
substitute for retributive justice in any case, no matter the stage at which amnesty
is granted. Therefore, amnesty does not just preclude admissibility because it
shields a person from prosecution in a trial, but because it shields them from the
criminal consequences of guilt, namely, punishment. Even where the current South
African NPA prosecuting policy satisfies investigation and decision, amnesty does
not determine a matter inadmissible because it shields a perpetrator from
retributive justice.
c. Unable: Article 17(3)
Article 17(3) similarly gives meaning to "unable" by providing that the Court
shall consider whether a State is unable to arrest the accused or obtain necessary
evidence and testimony, or is otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings due to a
total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system.
132
Where a state grants amnesties as part of a package because the number of
perpetrators makes it impossible, because it is unable to arrest the accused, or
because its legal system is in a state of disarray or collapse, 133 it would be held
"unable" upon a plain meaning of the word. Given the difficulty of satisfying the
requirements of other key terms, it would be absurd to attempt to find ways in
which an amnesty granted for these reasons would not be characterized as an
indication of an inability. The South African, Sierra Leonean, and Ugandan
situations demonstrate inability because the volume of perpetrators made it
impossible for the states to investigate and prosecute them.
128. MURPHY, supra note 64, at 45; see HELENA COBBAN, AMNESTY AFTER ATROCITY? HEALING
NATIONS AFTER GENOCIDE AND WAR CRIMES 71, 115,216 (2007).
129. This is supported by treaty-based duties in international law.
130. Williams & Schabas, supra note 58, at 623.
131. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, pmbl., Jul. 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
(entered into force July 1, 2002), available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/source/RecentTexts/rome-
en.htm [hereinafter Rome Statute].
132. Rome Statute, art. 17(3).
133. Majzub, supra note 42, at 268.
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d. Ne Bis In Idem - Trial and Court: Articles 17(1)(c) and 20
Articles 17(1)(c) and 20 preclude prosecution where the individual has been
tried for the same conduct in another court and convicted or acquitted. 134 The
ground is satisfied unless: (1) the trial shielded the accused from criminal
responsibility, or (2) was not independent and impartial in accordance with the
norms of due process and was inconsistent with an intent to bring a person to
justice.135 There are three ways in which truth and reconciliation commission
processes granting amnesty fail to meet this provision.1 36 First, a truth commission
hearing does not comport with what we ordinarily understand as a "trial" and
"court. 1 37 Even if we accept that the SATRC was sufficient because matters were
heard before Commissioners making reasoned determinations on the basis of
legislative criteria that were binding on local courts, it fails to meet the due process
requirements of criminal trials.1 38 While witnesses could be examined and cross-
examined, the accused was not afforded the presumption of innocence and freedom
from self-incrimination.1 39 Rather, proceedings commenced from an assumption of
guilt, and the grant of amnesty hinged on an ability to incriminate oneself and
others. These requirements are contrary to fundamental rights contained in the
right to a fair trial in Articles 9 and 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights 140 and other regional instruments, such as the African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights.1 41 While the reference to "norms of due process
recognized by international law" relates to independence and impartiality, 142 the
134. Rome Statute, arts. 17(1)(c), 20(1).
135. Rome Statute, art. 20(3)(a)-(b).
136. A footnote to the Preparatory Committee's draft of the Statute stated that draft article 15(1)(c)
"should also address, directly or indirectly, cases in which there was a prosecution resulting in
conviction or acquittal, as well as discontinuance of prosecution and possibly also pardons and
amnesties" but that "[i]t was agreed that these issues would be revisited in light of further revisions to
article 18." United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, Rome, It., June 15 - July 17, 1998, Report of the Preparatory Committee
on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 41, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/2/Add.1 (April
14, 1998), available at http://www.un.org/law/n9810105.pdf. The conference did not revisit the issue.
137. Van den Wyngaert & Ongena, supra note 125, at 727; see also Gavron, supra note 3, at 109;
Dugard, supra note 12, at 702.
138. See Ziyad Motala, The Use of the Truth Commission in South Africa as an Alternative Dispute
Resolution Mechanism Versus the International Law Obligations, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 913, 924-
25 (2005) (discussing independence and impartiality problems in South Africa).
139. Id.
140. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter the ICCPR].
141. African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, Jun. 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58.
Although it is arguable that these would only be relevant insofar as they are binding on the state.
142. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, pmbl., art. 20(3)(b), Jul. 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002), available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/source/
RecentTexts/rome-en.htm [hereinafter Rome Statute]. Article 20 contains an additional qualifier in
requiring the proceedings to be conducted "independently or impartially." Id These terms, which are
contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec.
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Pre-Trial Chamber may nevertheless take these additional norms into account.
143
Second, amnesty does not meet the qualifying words of "convicted" and
"acquitted." Not only does amnesty preclude a criminal trial in which a person can
be convicted, 144 it can hardly be said that amnesty constitutes an "acquittal," which
denotes an absence of guilt. Third, the traditional goal of the rule on double
jeopardy is "to prevent the state from repeatedly prosecuting a person for
offen[s]es arising out of the same incident until a conviction is obtained." 145 Given
a truth and reconciliation process is neither a prosecution nor an attempt to obtain a
conviction, upon a traditional approach, it would fall outside the ambit of ne bis in
idem.
A more expansive approach encompassing truth commissions is advocated by
states claiming that the restrictive approach is tainted by cultural imperialism and
is therefore not truly satisfactory as a norm of due process recognized by
international law. 146 This problem arises partly because treaty based rights and
norms are not yet universal. Claims of cultural imperialism have some merit if the
norms of due process were required to be customary. This is a hotly debated issue;
how it might be resolved involves a complex analysis of custom, its role, and the
participation of states in its establishment. It is tentatively posited that claims of
cultural imperialism are often closely tied to claims of cultural relativism, 147 which
are widely rejected on a number of grounds because the people often affected by
them object. While affected perpetrators might benefit from exceptions based on
cultural relativity, it cannot be said that victims would necessarily be so accepting.
In any event, this issue is foreclosed by the fourth ground, which is that amnesty
shields an accused from criminal responsibility and is inconsistent with the intent
to bring a person to justice.
2. The Interests of Justice
Article 53 provides that the prosecutor shall initiate an investigation unless he
or she determines that, when taking into account the gravity of the crime and the
interests of victims, there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an
investigation would not serve the interests of justice.1 48 It also provides that the
10, 1948), and the ICCPR, ordinarily refer to courts, and require that they be "independent" of
government. Motala, supra note 138, at 924-25. Blanket amnesties granted by the executive cannot be
considered independent and impartial decisions or proceedings. It is unlikely that a body such as the
TRC, albeit quasi-judicial, was sufficiently independent to satisfy these requirements.
143. Rome Statute, art. 20(3)(b).
144. Gwen Young, Comment: Amnesty and Accountability, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 427, 464-65,
469 (2002).
145. Majzub, supra note 42, at 270.
146. See Martha Minow, Making History or Making Peace: When Prosecutions Should Give Way
to Commissions and Peace Negotiations, 7 J. HUM. RTS. 174 (2008) (noting that as a matter of
principle, prosecutions may be preferred over TRCs).
147. See e.g., Guyora Binder, Cultural Relativism and Cultural Imperialism in Human Rights Law,
5 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 211,217-18 (1999).
148. Rome Statute, arts. 53(1)(c), (2)(c). Article 48 of the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence
further require that the Prosecutor consider article 53(1) when deciding to conduct a preliminary
examination of a situation.
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prosecutor may decline to prosecute if, upon investigation, he or she concludes that
there is no sufficient basis for a prosecution because it is not in the interests of
justice, taking into account all the circumstances including the gravity of the crime,
the interests of victims, the age or infirmity of the alleged perpetrator, and his or
her role in the alleged crime. 149 The Prosecutor applies both an evidentiary and
appropriateness test to determine whether to proceed with an investigation. 50
Whether the prosecutor can adopt an expansive approach accommodating amnesty
or must adopt a restrictive and exclusive approach depends upon two issues: (1)
the relevance and scope of the listed factors, including whether the interests of
justice are confined to the individual or to the situation as a whole, and (2) whether
those factors are exhaustive.
a. Scope of the Interests of Victims and the Role of the Perpetrator
In determining scope, the most relevant factor is the interests of victims.15 1
Whether amnesties are relevant to the interests of victims depends upon whether
those interests are limited to the matter at hand (i.e. the victims of the perpetrator)
or to the situation (i.e. future victims). The latter interpretation includes
considerations such as the extent to which prosecution might lead to further
violations because it creates incentives for those indicted to avoid conflict
resolution, and the extent to which alternative justice processes incorporating
amnesty facilitate stability and reconciliation of communities. This expansive
approach would require the Prosecutor to consider a tenuous connection between
investigating and prosecuting a perpetrator of crimes and future unknown victims.
The provision more logically requires that the interests of justice are limited to the
matter at hand because it requires the Prosecutor to demonstrate that it is not in the
interests of victims to investigate or prosecute. 152 In any event, even if a broader
view is adopted, it is difficult to argue that prosecution is not in the interests of
victims. In the case of actual victims, it does not presuppose an absence of other
reparative benefits. In the case of future victims, it might prevent that perpetrator
from committing further violations. 53 Upon the limited subset of factors, the
interests of justice would not accommodate amnesty.
Whether the role of perpetrators is relevant depends upon whether the role
regards their conduct in relation to the crime, their position in the organization to
which they belong, or the conflict. If role is to be relevant to amnesty, the
Prosecutor must be able to take a perpetrator's position into account. If a
149. Rome Statute, art. 53(2)(c). The different formulations may indicate nothing other than that
the Prosecutor has more latitude to investigate a person until their role is determined and until he or she
can establish who the perpetrator is. Morten Bergsmo & Pieter Kruger, Article 53: Initiation of an
Investigation, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
OBSERVERS' NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 1065, 1072 (Otto Triffterer ed., 2d ed. 2008).
150. See Rome Statute, arts. 53(1)(a), 2(a) (containing the evidentiary test); Bergsmo & Kruger,
supra note 149, at 1067.
151. The age of the perpetrator is not relevant to amnesty.
152. Rome Statute, arts. 15(1)(f), (2)(f).
153. See Anja Seibert-Fohr, Symposium, Human Rights as Guiding Principles in the Context of
Post Conflict Justice, 13 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 179, 182 (2005) (noting that any model chosen has
implications for preventing future atrocities).
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perpetrator's role were relevant to amnesty, it would not be possible to adopt an
entirely expansive approach that defers to all amnesties because the role in itself
requires distinction between perpetrators. Role, in this regard, is relevant in one of
two ways. On the one hand, if amnesty granted to an authoritative figure facilitates
peace by permitting them to engage in negotiations without fear of prosecution, a
less restrictive view would find it not in the interests of justice to proceed with an
investigation or prosecution. The Prosecutor might take the role of the perpetrator
into account by deferring to amnesties for individuals with authority to negotiate
peace agreements. On the other hand, prosecuting authoritative figures might
prevent them from committing further violations. The prosecutor might then
prosecute only those most responsible, but not low-level perpetrators.
There is value in targeting those with authority and effective control to
condone or effectuate crimes because it may provide the only deterrent: making
government and rebel leaders aware of the possibility of prosecution might lead to
fewer violations.154 In Uganda, Kony's removal is vital to making the LRA
ineffectual, as he "stands at the apex of the LRA structure, politically, militarily,
and spiritually." '155 The situation in Sudan is more complicated because
government leaders have been indicted, and instability in Darfur entrenches al-
Bashir and other government leaders' positions (by preventing a unified front in
the region).156 If those indicted were arrested and successfully prosecuted, it is
possible that regime change (and possible international intervention) could reduce
crime and even stabilize the region.
The difficulty with this approach is that international courts and tribunals
have tended to commence their investigations by focusing on lower level
perpetrators in order to extract evidence to build their case against more senior
officials. 15 7 Like the ad hoe tribunals, the ICC has statute-based mechanisms by
which it can obtain evidence to build its case. For example, Article 93 provides
that states' parties must assist the ICC with evidence gathering, including the
taking of witness statements, execution of searches and seizures, and the provision
of records and documents.158 Gathering evidence necessarily relies on state
support, initially proffered by Uganda, but not at all by Sudan.
How the Prosecutor and the Court might consider role can be deduced from
the Appeals Chamber's decision in the Lubanga case.1 59 While the case dealt with
154. See Nsongurua J. Udombana, Pay Back Time in Sudan? Darfur in the International Criminal
Court, 13 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 1, 44 (2005) ("History has shown that the involvement of highly
placed functionaries or officials of states makes the commission of most international crimes possible; it
is great men, potential saints, not little men, who become merciless fanatics.")
155. Payam Akhavan, The Lord's Resistance Army Case: Uganda's Submission of the First State
Referral to the International Criminal Court, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 403, 420 (2005).
156. AI-Bashir Should be Delivered to the ICC, Editorial, MMEGIONLINE (July 29, 2010),
http://new.mmegi.bw/index.php?sid=9&aid=3774&dir=2010/July/Thursday29.
157. For example, the ICTY's first trial was against Tadid, who was a prison guard.
158. Rome Statute, art. 93(1)(b), (1)(h)-(i).
159. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-8, Decision on the
Prosecutor's Application for a Warrant of Arrest, 37 (Feb. 10, 2006).
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the role of the perpetrator in relation to gravity, 160 it discussed the relevant
perpetrator's authority when determining the appropriateness of commencing an
investigation and prosecution.161 In considering gravity, the Pre-Trial Chamber
held that the ICC's "deterrent effect would be greatest if [it] only dealt with the
highest-ranking perpetrators" because they "are the ones who can most effectively
prevent or stop the commission of such crimes." 162 Those "most senior leaders"
could be identified by: (1) the position played by the accused; (2) their role in
systemic or large-scale crimes; and (3) the role of state entities, organizations or
armed groups. 163 On appeal, the Prosecutor opposed this test because he said it
would:
[I]nappropriately limit his Prosecutorial discretion and would make it
impossible to investigate and prosecute perpetrators lower down the
chain of command... ; the investigation and prosecution of low and mid-
level perpetrators may in certain circumstances be necessary to generate
evidence and build a case against the perpetrators on the highest
level. 164
He went on to argue that:
[T]he Pre-Trial Chamber improperly placed emphasis on the authority
of suspects to negotiate and sign peace agreements, and.., improperly
created a criterion that suspects have to be core actors in the decision-
making process of policies or practices or have autonomy to change or
to prevent the implementation of policies and practices.
165
The Appeals Chamber agreed. It found that it is "more logical to assume that
the deterrent effect of the Court is highest if no category of perpetrators is per se
excluded from potentially being brought before the court," 1 6 6 and the "capacity of
individuals to prevent crimes in the field should not be implicitly or inadvertently
assimilated to the preventative role of the Court more generally." 167 The Appeals
160. Gravity is relevant to admissibility at the investigation stage and the interests of justice. Rome
Statute, arts. 17(1)(d), 53(1)(c), 2(c). While gravity should be interpreted the same way for both, its
inclusion under article 53 ensures that the Prosecutor takes gravity into account when considering the
interests of justice. So while gravity is not left entirely to the Prosecutor's discretion because it is a
constituent part of article 17, it can nevertheless play a role in aspects of the Prosecutor's discretion that
are subject to limited judicial review. See Bergsmo & Kruger, supra note 149, at 1071; Sharon A.
Williams & William A. Schabas, Article 17: Issues of Admissibility, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS' NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 605,
621 (Otto Triffterer ed., 2d ed. 2008) (discussing gravity).
161. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-8, Decision on the
Prosecutor's Application for a Warrant of Arrest, 37 (Feb. 10, 2006).
162. Ex parte Prosecutor, Case No. ICC-01/04, Judgment on the Prosecutor's Appeal against the
decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled "Decision on the Prosecutor's Application for Warrants of
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Chamber found that the criteria developed by the Pre-Trial Chamber ignored that
"the highly variable constitutions and operations of different organizations could
encourage any future perpetrators to avoid criminal responsibility before the [ICC]
simply by ensuring that they are not a visible part of the high-level decision
making process.1 68 It emphasized that "individuals who are not at the very top of
an organization may still carry a considerable influence and commit, or generate
the widespread commission of, very serious crimes."1 6 9 Consequently, the Appeals
Chamber found the factors related to role identified by the Pre-Trial Chamber were
"not necessarily directly related to gravity in article 17(1)(d). 170
The Prosecutor and the Court were concerned that: (1) the authority and
influence of individuals is highly variable and may not be determined by ranking
within an organization or in a situation, and (2) regard to role in an organization or
conflict would detract from the preventative and punitive goals of the Court.171
Even though the decision concerned gravity, these principles are highly pertinent
to the scope and relevance of role more generally. The case indicates that not only
the Prosecutor, but also the Court, will adopt the more restrictive approach; that is,
that role relates to the crime rather than the perpetrator's authority and influence.
172
Adopting a middle road, where only amnesty for those most responsible is upheld,
is not a viable option.
b. Other Factors
While subject to debate, the Prosecutor may take into account other grounds
at both the investigation and prosecution stages. In determining whether to
investigate, the Prosecutor must consider whether he has substantial reasons to
believe investigation would not serve the interests of justice, even when taking into
account the gravity of the crime and the interests of victims. 173 Additional factors
are required to determine whether the Prosecutor can demonstrate substantial
reasons. 174 Article 53(2)(c) adopts a more straightforward approach in its use of the
word "including." Additional gaps in Article 53 lend support to a broad discretion






172. It is notable that, in the Al Bashir case, the Pre-Trial Chamber found that it "neither has the
power to review, nor is responsible for, the Prosecution's assessment that, under the current
circumstances in Sudan, the initiation of a case against Omar Al Bashir and three alleged commanders
of organized armed groups would not be detrimental to the interests of justice." Prosecutor v. Omar
Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/09, Decision on Prosecution's Application for
Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, 15 (Mar. 4, 2009).
173. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, arts. 53(1)(c), 2(c), Jul. 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002), available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/source/
RecentTexts/rome-en.htm. [hereinafter Rome Statute].
174. According to Bergsmo & Kruger, the word "[shall] does not give the Prosecutor room for
arbitrary decision making if he or she assesses the preliminary information as providing a reasonable
basis on which to proceed under the Statute." Bergsmo & Kruger, supra note 149, at 1068.
175. Stahn, supra note 93, at 719-20.
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The factors that may be taken into account depend upon what we mean by
justice. There are three ways in which we might define it: (1) as a term of law
limited to retributive justice (as per article 17); (2) as a term of law which has been
broadened by state practice to incorporate peace building, reconciliation, and
reparation; or (3) where law has not been broadened by state practice, as a term
incorporating legal, political, and social factors. 176 The first and most restrictive
view would limit justice to retributive justice. As noted in the introduction, the
second approach is unclear as a matter of customary international law. The third
and expansive approach leaves scope for amnesties to be accommodated.
177
Many scholars put forward grounds supporting an expansive view.
17
According to Ohlin, "it is difficult to think of a factor that would not be
relevant. 1 79 GropengieBer and Meiffner concur, arguing that the interests ofjustice
incorporate more than "just criminali[z]ation of an offence, because the
circumstances of the offence, the perpetrator, and the victim can be outweighed by
other factors not related to wrongfulness and guilt."180 According to their
interpretation, justice incorporates "a peaceful society." '18 1 Bourdon notes that the
statute drafters "wished... to give 'carte blanche' to the Prosecutor to take a
decision which is quite clearly entirely political, namely a decision in the course of
which he would have to weigh the requirement of peace and reconciliation on the
one hand against the need for justice on the other. 1 12 Goldstone and Fritz agree
that "few would aver that [justice] is demanding in the sense that it is always
retributive." '183 According to these scholars, the expansive approach allows the
Prosecutor to consider broader goals such as amnesty's contribution to effecting
176. Rome Statute, art. 17.
177. According to Gavron, which ground a court adopts might be dependent on whether a civil
rather than common law approach is adopted. Gavron, supra note 3, at 110. Given international courts
and tribunals adopt a combination of civil and common law approaches, it is difficult to say which
approach will be influential.
178. However, few of these argue that an expansive view is justified. See Eric Blumenson, The
Challenge of a Global Standard of Justice: Peace, Pluralism, and Punishment at the International
Criminal Court, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 801, 803 (2006); Elizabeth M. Evenson, Note, Truth and
Justice in Sierra Leone: Coordination Between Commission and Court, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 730, 733
(2004); Robert Gomez, Transitional States, The ICC, and Amnesties: Establishing an Advisory
Commission, 3 Eyes on the ICC 57 (2006); Philipp Kastner, The ICC in Darfur -Savior or Spoiler? 14
ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 145, 166-67 (2007); Majzub, supra note 42 at 249; Minow, supra note 146,
at 175; Newman, supra note 6, at 322; Scharf, supra note 58 at 350; Ronald C. Slye, The Legitimacy of
Amnesties Under International Law and General Principles of Anglo-American Law: Is a Legitimate
Amnesty Possible?, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 173, 183-84 (2002); Charles Trumbull IV, Giving Amnesties a
Second Chance, 25 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 284, 313 (2007).
179. Ohlin, supra note 36, at 188.
180. GropengieBer & MeiBner, supra note 121, at 193.
181. Id.
182. William Bourdon, Amnesty, CRIMES OF WAR A-Z GUIDE, http://www.crimesofwar.org/
thebook/amnesty.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2011). The problem with this approach is that it is circular; it
distinguishes reconciliation from justice such that the interests of justice, upon a literal interpretation,
exclude reconciliation.
183. Richard Goldstone & Nicole Fritz, The ICC Prosecutor's Unprecedented Powers, 13 LEIDEN
J. INT'L L. 655, 662 (2000).
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conflict resolution, reconciling communities, eliciting truth about and causes of the
conflict, in addition to a need for certainty and stability (post-conflict) to maintain
the rule of law.
Many others opt for the more restrictive approach. 184 While ICC's Office of
the Prosecutor's Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice dealt with amnesty in
passing, it comprehensively set out the grounds for adopting a more restrictive
approach.185 The Prosecutor submits that justice contributes to peace, which he
reinforces with the statement made by the Secretary General of the United Nations
that "[j]ustice, peace and democracy are not mutually exclusive objectives, but
rather mutually reinforcing imperatives. 186 Discretion is to be guided by the
objects and purposes of the Statute, "namely the prevention of serious crimes of
concern to the international community through ending impunity" and the
guarantee of "lasting respect for and enforcement of international justice., 187 The
Prosecutor's conclusion is buttressed by the consistent trend in the last ten to
fifteen years of imposing a duty on states to prosecute, which indicates that the
pursuit of justice is not a question of whether we agree or disagree in moral or
practical terms, but a matter of the law. 188 The policy is explicit that the ICC's
justice mandate (i.e. to prosecute) must be carried out independently and that, for
all other matters involving the interaction of humanitarian, security, political,
development, and justice elements, the OTP will "work constructively with and
respect the mandates of those engaged in other areas."18 9 While the interests of
justice accommodate "crime prevention and security[J... the broader matter of
international peace and security is not the responsibility of the Prosecutor" but that
of the Security Council.190 Factors which might then be taken into account in this
restrictive approach would include those already identified by the objects of the
statute, such as the prevention of impunity. The Prosecutor might then decide it is
not in the interests of justice to proceed where the victims have already obtained
some form of reparation, the perpetrator is a low-level offender who might have
committed a small number of violations, investigation and prosecution of the
matter will not extract evidence that might be useful in cases against more senior
figures, and refraining from prosecution will not contribute to widespread impunity
and lawlessness.
Before going on to consider how the Security Council and the situations in
four countries affect the application of these approaches, there are three restrictions
on Prosecutorial discretion that impact additional factors and might be taken into
account. First, while it is desirable to accommodate all other relevant factors, it is
necessary to exclude factors that are explicitly or impliedly taken into account by
184. For example, see Roth, supra note 41, at 765; Gareth Evans, cited in the OTP's Newsletter,
supra note 40, at 5.
185. OTP Policy Paper, supra note 31, at 1.
186. Id at 8.
187. Id. at 1, 4.
188. Id. at4.
189. Id. at 8.
190. Id at 8-9.
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the interests of victims and the role of the perpetrator. These would include
consideration of the Prosecutor's impact upon potential future victims, i.e. the
possibility that prosecution might lead to further violations, and whether the
perpetrator might be in a position to effect peace negotiations. Further, the factors
must demonstrate that it is not in the interests of justice to investigate or prosecute.
Second, because of the explicit phrase "under this Statute" in the chapeau of
Article 53(1), when making decisions the Prosecutor must take into account the
Statute's preambular objectives of ensuring that the most serious crimes do not go
unpunished, effective prosecution is ensured, and ICC prosecutions are
complementary to national criminal jurisdiction, put an end to impunity, and
guarantee lasting respect for the enforcement of international justice.1 91 What
justice might mean is justice in the international rather than domestic sense;
according to the weight of state practice, international justice generally requires
criminal prosecution and punishment. Third, Articles 53(1)(c) and 2(c) adopt a
higher burden of proof at both the investigation and prosecution stage. 92 The
chapeau of Article 53(1) requires the Prosecutor to have a reasonable basis to
refrain from investigating.1 93  However, reasonable basis upon investigation is
raised to reasonable grounds at the arrest warrant stage (Article 58) and substantial
reasons and sufficient basis at the confirmation of indictment stage (Article
53(1)(c) and 2(c) respectively). 194 On their ordinary meaning, substantial and
sufficient require more than "reasonable."1 95 The Prosecutor must have more than
suspicion that a prosecution (irrespective of whether amnesty had been granted)
would impact upon peace negotiations.1 96 Fourth, and as discussed in relation to
the interests of victims, the factors should be limited to matters "directly bearing
on the case itself," that is, the individual matter rather than the broad situation.
197
This might be supported by the substantial reasons test, because a more expansive
approach would require a considerable amount of speculation regarding tenuous
connections between potential victims and the effects of investigation and
prosecution. Individualization is consistent with the scope of the other factors that
the Prosecutor may take into account including the role and age of the perpetrator,
and the gravity of the crime, which are necessarily individual in nature. This
191. The final paragraph of the Preamble provides that states resolve to "guarantee lasting respect
for and the enforcement of international justice." Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
pmbl., Jul. 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002), available at
http://treaties.un.org/doc/source/RecentTexts/rome-en.htm [hereinafter Rome Statute]. It is of no
relevance that this phrase is not in the chapeau of article 53(2) because the Prosecutor must have
already considered the objects of the statute in terms of the interests ofjustice at the investigation stage.
192. See Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision on the
Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, 8-9 (Mar.
4, 2009) (Judge Ugacka Dissenting); and Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, Case No. ICC-
02/05-01/09-OA, Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the "Decision on the Prosecution's
Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir," 30 (Feb. 3, 2010).
193. Rome Statute, arts. 15(3), 15(6), 53(1).
194. Rome Statute, art. 53(2).
195. Bergsmo & Kruger, supra note 149, at 1069.
196. Id at 1071-72.
197. Gavron, supra note 3, at 110.
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limitation alone could exclude amnesty from consideration because it requires the
Prosecutor to consider the impact of prosecution of one individual on the peace
process, rather than the impact of failing to give deference to national amnesties
more generally.
C. The Security Council
The Security Council may request deferral of any investigation or prosecution
into situations or of individuals for twelve months, irrespective of the method by
which the ICC exercises jurisdiction. 198 It may do so under two circumstances: (1)
when it has issued a resolution pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and (2)
where "deferral is consistent with the purpose and principles of the United Nations
with respect to maintaining international peace and security, resolving threatening
situations in conformity with principles of justice and international law, and
promoting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms under Article 24 of
the UN Charter."1 99 While each deferral may only extend for twelve months, there
is no limit to the number of times it can be renewed; 200 it could defer indefinitely
provided there is political willingness within the Security Council. Nevertheless,
Chapter VII of the UN Charter limits the Security Council as the deferral must be
justified on the grounds of peace and/or security.20 1 When a situation has
stabilized, and peace is seemingly achieved, the Security Council would lose its
power to defer.
Some argue that the referral power in Article 13 nevertheless gives the
Security Council greater scope to limit jurisdiction by allowing it to impose
conditions on referrals of situations, and thereby allowing it to "insulate domestic
amnesty arrangements from the reach of the ICC. ' ' 20 2 However, this view is
unwarranted. Even if the phrase "acting under Chapter VII" in Article 13 could be
interpreted to afford the Security Council a broad power, the drafting history
justifies a restrictive view. The first draft put forward by the International Law
Commission (ILC) in 1994 provided that the ICC could not exercise jurisdiction
over a situation where the Security Council was dealing with it as a threat to peace
or security, unless the Security Council issued a resolution.2 3 Some ILC members
opposed the provision on the basis that it was inappropriate that a political decision
of another forum could prevent the Court from operating.20 4 Investigations and
prosecutions upon referral or propio motu were introduced and the Security
198. Rome Statute, art. 16.
199. See Scharf, supra note 58, at 369 (referring to U.N. Charter, arts. 24, 39, para. 1).
200. Rome Statute, art. 16.
201. The Security Council may only issue a resolution when the matter constitutes a threat to the
peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression. See U.N. Charter art. 39.
202. David Scheffer, Staying the course with the International Criminal Court, 35 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 47, 90 (2002); see also Dan Sarooshi, The Peace and Justice Paradox: The International Criminal
Court and the UN Security Council, in THE PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: LEGAL
AND POLICY ISSUES 95, 97 (Dominic McGoldrick, Peter Rowe, and Eric Donnelly eds., 2004).
203. Morten Bergsmo & Jelena Pejid, Article 16: Deferral of Investigation or Prosecution, in
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 595, 595 (Otto
Triffterer ed., 2d ed. 2008).
204. Id at 596.
VOL. 39:2
BRINGING PEACE TO DARFUR AND UGANDA
Council's power was restricted to 12-month deferrals.20 5
Whether the Security Council would exercise its deferral power on the basis
of amnesty is likely to depend upon the means by which the ICC came to exercise
jurisdiction. It is difficult to reconcile deferral with a prior referral by the Security
Council, such as in the case of Darfur, because referral assumes that exercising
206international criminal jurisdiction contributes to peace. It is also unlikely that the
Security Council would defer a matter where a state had referred the situation,
unless that state made a subsequent request for it to do so. There are few obvious
constraints impeding Security Council intervention in the case of a propio motu
investigation 207 other than a desire to maintain the perception of prosecutorial
independence.
While the Security Council has been willing over the last two decades to
intervene in conflicts that will fall within the ICC's jurisdiction on the basis that
they are a threat to peace and security,20 8 the threshold might be such that the
power would very rarely be used209 in general, let alone for amnesty. Moreover, it
is unlikely that the Security Council would vote for repeated and indefinite
deferrals affecting the long-term ability of the Court to exercise jurisdiction. The
consequence of a Security Council deferral is, at least in the short-term, a political
one. It might add legitimacy to amnesties as a tool for ensuring peace and security,
and strengthen the position of advocates of amnesty. However, in the face of
eventual prosecution, the political impact is unlikely to lead to a customary norm
in favor of amnesty, particularly given the debate regarding amnesties for serious
crimes is more concerned with conditions imposed on the amnesties rather than on
permission or prohibition per se.1°
If the Security Council required deferral, the Prosecutor could challenge the
resolution in the Pre-Trial Chamber. It is arguable that the Court would not be
constrained by a Security Council resolution because it retains competence de la
competence: the competence to determine its own jurisdiction over rationae loci
and rationae personae.2  It is not a subsidiary body. Rather, it "wrest[s] some
powers from the [Security Council]. 212 If this were the case, the decision whether
to uphold an amnesty turns on: (1) whether the Security Council has jurisdiction to
205. Id. at 597.
206. Id at 599.
207. But see Han, supra note 119, at 101.
208. Gavron, supra note 3, at 109.
209. Id.
210. See discussion infra Part III.
211. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 19(1), Jul. 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
(entered into force July 1, 2002), available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/source/RecentTexts/rome-
en.htm; see also Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defense Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 6 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995);
Scharf, supra note 58, at 369 (arguing that the Tadit case "suggests that the ICC could assert that it has
authority to independently assess whether these two requirements are met.").
212. Udombana, supra note 154, at 6. Parties opposed to the initial draft provision argued that it
"infringed on the judicial independence of the court," and/or that that the International Court of Justice
was not subject to similar controls. See Bergsmo & Peji6, supra note 204, at 596.
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exercise its powers, and (2) whether it has done so in a way consistent with the
purposes and principles of the UN Charter.
In regards to the first, it is debatable whether the Pre-Trial Chamber has the
competence to determine the existence of a threat to peace or an act of aggression,
213as these are primarily political determinations. States have conferred primary
responsibility to the Security Council for the maintenance of peace and security.
214
According to Bergsmo, the ICC Statute does not and could not weaken the
Council's ability to fulfill its obligations under the UN Charter; rather, the Court
becomes a tool for maintaining peace and security.21 5 While seemingly inconsistent
with the independence of the Court, as a matter of constitutional order, authority to
assess threats to peace and security could be an inappropriate extension of power
in determining admissibility.216 This is not to say that support for a residual power
to determine whether the Security Council resolution is consistent with the
purposes and principles of the UN isn't warranted. The competence de la
competence of international judicial institutions to review Security Council
resolutions was upheld in the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia's (ICTY) Tadi6 case, 217 and the International Court of Justice's
Namibia, Wall, and Serbia cases.2" The Court's power of review would be limited
to assessing its own jurisdiction,219 and the extent to which a Security Council
220resolution complies with article 16 of the Rome Statute, such as to determine
213. In regard to aggression, the Pre-Trial Chamber has not been authorized to determine an act of
aggression as a matter of criminal culpability because states have not yet agreed on its definition; it
therefore remains an essentially political rather than legal determination.
214. U.N. Charter arts. 24, 39.
215. Morten Bergsmo, Occasional Remarks on Certain State Concerns About the Jurisdictional
Reach of the International Criminal Court, and their Possible Implications for their Relationship
Between the Court and the Security Council, 69 NORDIC J. OF INT'L L. 87, 113 (2000).
216. Ntoubandi argues that the ICJ nevertheless is competent to determine a dispute between the
ICC and the Security Council regarding the existence of a threat to peace or security. NTOUBANDI,
supra note 11, at 206.
217. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction 29, 30 (Oct. 2, 1995).
218. In Tadi, the ICTY found the power "implicit in the notion of adjudication itself." Id. 18.
Although not reviewing resolutions directed at it, the ICJ used its power in the Legal Consequences for
States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding
Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J 16, 35, 66-67 (June 21); and
in Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. &
Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 91, 212 (Feb. 26). See Sarooshi, supra note 203, at 114.
The European Court of Justice, the Human Rights Committee and the United Kingdom House of Lords
have also adopted various approaches to adjudicating Security Council Resolutions ranging from
interventionist to deferent: Kadi & Al Barakaat Int'l Found. v. Council of the European Union &
Comm'n of the European Comty., 2008 Eur. Ct. H. R. 1-06351 (2008); Sayadi & Vinck v. Belgium,
CCPR/C/94/D/1472/2006, Application to have names removed from the Consolidated List of the
United Nations Sanctions Committe (U.N. Human Rights Committee Dec. 29, 2008); R (on the
application of al-Jedda) v. Secretary of State for Defence, [2007] UKHL 58; Behrami v. France and
Saramati v. France, Germany & Norway, Joined Cases 71412/01 & 78166/01, Eur. Ct. H. R. (2007),
available at http://graduateinstitute.ch/faculty/clapham/hrdoc/docs/ECHRBehrami.doc.
219. Sarooshi, supra note 203, at 115.
220. Id. at 98-99; see also Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 42, Jul. 17, 1998,
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whether it constitutes "an abuse of authority.., or [an] obvious and grave
deficiency. '221 Determining an abuse of process or grave deficiency would allow
the Court to find that the resolution was unfounded because it was clearly outside
Security Council power. The Court could also find that the resolution was
inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the UN as required by Article 24,
paragraph 2 of the UN Charter,222 where the Security Council attempted to resolve
a threatening situation in a way that is inconsistent with "justice and international
law,, 223 a legal rather than political determination. This would require an
assessment of the status of amnesties under international law.224 It is arguable that
the Court can find a resolution invalid if it does not take into account the jus
225cogens character of an obligation or a duty to prosecute.
How this issue is resolved may still depend upon the international
constitutional order, the hierarchical status between member states, the Security
Council, and the ICC. According to GropengieBer and MeiBner, any findings by
the Court would be binding on ratifying states since they have subjected
226themselves to its authority. However, states are also bound by Security Council
resolutions pursuant to Article 103 of the UN Charter, which provides that "[i]n the
event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations
under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international
agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail., 227 Security
Council resolutions have a hierarchical supremacy over international treaties.228
One view is that, to the extent that a resolution would require a state to take or
not take action, it would only bind that member state and not the ICC, which has a
distinct legal personality. 29 The Security Council cannot operate beyond its own
powers to require the ICC to act inconsistently with its own treaty obligations. The
court retains authority to determine whether Article 16 was complied with
230
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002), available at
http://treaties.un.org/doc/source/RecentTexts/rome-en.htm [hereinafter Rome Statute]; see also the
discussion of article 53 of the Rome Statute below.
221. Gropengieller & Mei~ner, supra note 121, at 191.
222. See Rome Statute, art. 16 (requiring that the Security Council act in accordance with Chapter
VII of the U.N. Charter, which in turn requires it to comply with the purposes and principles of the UN
laid out in article 24 of the U.N. Charter).
223. See U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 2; see also U.N. Charter pmbl.
224. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 15, at 80.
225. Gropengieller & Mei~ner, supra note 121, at 191.
226. Id.
227. U.N. Charter art. 103; see Bergsmo & Pejid, supra note 204, at 596 (noting that in the context
of complete Security Council control over the jurisdiction of the ICC, a proposed preambular "savings
clause" to ensure the Charter was paramount was rejected).
228. R (on the application of al-Jedda) v. Sec'y of State for Defence, [2007] UKHL 58.
229. Sarooshi, supra note 203, at 106; see also Rome Statute, art. 48(2) (requiring member States
to carry out decisions of the Security Council "directly and through their action in the appropriate
international agencies of which they are members"); Matthew Happold, Darfur, The Security Council,
and the International Criminal Court, 55 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 226, 233 (2006).
230. Sarooshi, supra note 203, at 106-07.
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because neither member State obligations nor Security Council Resolutions could
alter its treaty-based obligations.23 1
The alternate view is put forward by Gropengieer and Meiner, who argue
that member states cannot contract out of the UN Charter and Security Council
obligations by creating an international organization, and that any such
international organization is indirectly bound by the obligations of its member
states.232 That resolutions are directed at the ICC rather than member states might
be resolved by Cassese who described an analogous institution, the ICTY, as a
"giant without arms and legs - it needs artificial limbs to walk and work. And
those artificial limbs are state authorities. 233 The ICC becomes a conglomeration
of member states. Sarooshi adds that the retention of Security Council "veto"
rights supports the retention of Security Council discretion because states could
merely have required a referral without a Chapter VII resolution.234 That referral
required such a resolution could indicate an intention to provide the Security
Council with authority over the ICC. This is nevertheless resolved by accepting
that the Court has the authority to determine whether the Security Council acted in
excess of its power because as a judicial body, it is distinguished from member
states.235 The ICC fulfills a judicial function in an international separation of
powers, and the Security Council the executive. 216 Member states will be bound by
court decisions because the resolution would not be lawful and would not
withstand Article 103 of the UN Charter.
Whether the Pre-Trial Chamber will adopt a cautious approach is yet to be
seen; the paradox is that, while politicization might threaten the ICC's legitimacy,
it needs political backing to maintain it. Nevertheless, as Ohlin notes, it might be
"highly unlikely that the [ICC] will be staffed by sitting judges who are inclined to
take the conservative legal view that the Court - an independent judicial body -




If the Prosecutor defers to amnesties granted by truth commissions in terms of
admissibility, he must find that they satisfy two things: (1) the terms investigation
and decision, or (2) the requirement of ne bis in idem.238 In either case, they must
231. Kastner, supra note 179, at 153.
232. Gropengieger & Meiner, supra note 121, at 189-90; see also Lipscomb, supra note 25, at
201-02.
233. Antonio Cassese, On the Current Trends towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of
Breaches ofInternational Humanitarian Law, 9 EUR. J. INT'L L. 2, 13 (1998).
234. Sarooshi, supra note 203, at 100-101.
235. Id. at 106-107, 113-14.
236. But see Stefan Talmon, The Security Council As World Legislature, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 175,
175, 177 (2005) (stating that the Security Council acts as a quasi-legislative body).
237. Ohlin, supra note 36, at 194.
238. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, arts. 17, 20, Jul. 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
(entered into force July 1, 2002), available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/source/RecentTexts/rome-
en.htm [hereinafter Rome Statute]; see Han, supra note 119, at 98.
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also demonstrate a willingness to bring a perpetrator to justice.239 The first ground
is arguable if investigation and decision do not require prosecution to be the
objective of investigation (albeit unlikely given the intersection of investigation
and prosecution in the statute). The second ground, ne bis in idem, is likely to fail
largely because a truth commission does not have the power to convict or acquit.
Even if either of those grounds were satisfied, a conditional amnesty granted by a
truth commission will not satisfy admissibility because amnesty cannot do
anything other than shield a perpetrator from prosecution and from retributive
justice. The only avenue open to the Prosecutor to defer to amnesty is to find that it
is in the interests of justice because: (1) justice is a term of law which has been
broadened by state practice to incorporate peace building, reconciliation, and
reparation; or (2) justice is a term incorporating legal, political, and social
factors.240 How the Prosecutor or the Pre-Trial Chamber might decide the latter
could be informed by assessing the functional and structural significance of
Security Council power. The residual deferral power of the Security Council
indicates that the ICC's role is to, as contended by Gareth Evans, interpret its
rationae personae as a purely legal matter to the exclusion of world, regional, or
domestic politics. 241 The Security Council retains the power to trump ICC
jurisdiction for a determinate period where policy matters prevail.242
II. CASE STUDIES
In order to consider whether the Prosecutor can or should adopt an expansive
view of the interests of justice, it is necessary to place the framework outlined in
context by examining the situations of Darfur and Uganda, which are currently
subject to ICC jurisdiction, and Sierra Leone and South Africa, which offered
amnesties in conjunction with domestic or international prosecution.
A. Darfur
The conflicts plaguing the South, West (Darfur), and East of Sudan since the
1980's evolved out of increasing marginalization of periphery communities from
the centralized government led by General Omar al-Bashir.243 Al-Bashir's military
dictatorship following seizure of power in 1989 neglected periphery communities
and exploited the cleavage between farmers and herdsman by abolishing tribal land
allocation and the governing structure; it imposed government appointed
administrators and politicized the divide between Africans and Arabs.244 The
239. See Rome Statute, art. 17(2) (defining unwillingness on the part of a State); see also Han,
supra note 119, at 98.
240. See GropengieBer & Meilner, supra note 121, at 192-94; Roht, supra note 15, at 81; see also
Ohlin, supra note 36, at 198-99.
241. OTP's Newsletter, supra note 40, at 5.
242. See Bergsmo & Pejid, supra note 204, at 598 ("[T]he Security Council's deferral power
confirms its decisive role in dealing with situations where the requirements of peace and justice seem to
be in conflict."); see also Han, supra note 119, at 100.
243. See OMER ISMAIL & MAGGIE FICK, DARFUR REBELS 101, THE ENOUGH PROJECT (Jan. 2009),
available at http://www.enoughproject.org/files/publications/Darfur%/o2ORebels%/o20101.pdf.
244. Kastner, supra note 179, at 156-57 ("[Arabs and Africans] have intermarried in the past and..
• are all Muslim and mostly speak Arabic"); Lipscomb, supra note 25, at 188-89; Peper A. Nyaba, The
2011
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
simmering conflict in Darfur erupted in April 2003 when the rebel groups, the
Sudanese Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M), and later the Justice and Equality
Movement (JEM), attacked government forces.245 When the government failed to
halt the insurrection it recruited mercenaries from other countries246 and re-armed,
trained, and funded the Arab militia group, the Janjaweed (literally 'devils on
horseback'), and partly incorporated them into the army through the Popular
Defense Force.247 The Janjaweed, allegedly upon government orders, targeted the
civilian populations of the Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit tribes to prevent them from
joining or supporting the SLA/M and JEM.248 International crimes constituting
crimes against humanity and war crimes 249 - including genocide, persecution,
murder, rape, burning and pillaging of villages, disappearances, torture, the forced
recruitment of child soldiers, and attacks on peacekeepers, humanitarian forces,
250
and internally displaced persons (IDPs) within IDP camps 251 - were allegedly
committed by government or government backed actors. In May 2004, the
Sudanese government established the National Commission of Inquiry (National
Commission) to investigate alleged violations of human rights by armed groups in
Darfur, which reported that all parties committed crimes, but that the numbers of
persons killed was exaggerated, and that rape and crimes of sexual violence were
not widespread or systemic.25 2 It recommended judicial investigation of specific
incidents and a committee to investigate property losses.
253
The international community was slow to respond. It initially turned a blind
eye to Darfur with the expectation that Sudan's demonstration of good faith and
resolution of the North-South conflict would serve as a precursor and model for
25421peace. Despite invoking Chapter VII of the UN Charter,255 deference to state
Grassroots Peace Making in South Sudan A resort to an Indigenous African Justice System, 8(1) E.
AIR. J. PEACE HUM. RTs. 97, 99 (2002).
245. Christopher D. Totten & Nicholas Tyler, Arguing for an Integrated Approach to Resolving the
Crisis in Darfur: the Challenges of Complementarity, Enforcement, and Related Issues in the
International Criminal Court, 98(3) J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1069, 1083 (2008); Udombana, supra
note 154, at 5-6.
246. Kastner, supra note 179, at 157.
247. Id at 158-60; Udombana, supra note 154, at 6-7.
248. Kastner, supra note 179, at 159.
249. Lipscomb, supra note 25, at 185.
250. Heather Cash, Security Council Resolution 1593 and Conflicting Principles of International
Law: How the Future of the International Criminal Court is at Stake, 45 BRANDEIS L.J. 573, 575
(2007); Robert Cryer, Sudan, Resolution 1593, and International Criminal Justice, 19(1) LEIDEN J.
INT'L L. 195, 198 (2006); Udombana, supra note 154, at 6.
251. See Cryer, supra note 252, at 198 (stating 1.65 million remain displaced in camps in Sudan,
and two million crossed into refugee camps in neighboring Chad); see also Lipscomb, supra note 25, at
187.
252. Int'l Comm'n of Inquiry on Darfur, Report to the United Nations Secretary General pursuant
to Security Council Resolution 1546 of18 September 2004, 456, 461, U.N. Doc. S/2005/60 (Jan. 25,
2005), available at http://www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com-inq_darfur.pdf [hereinafter Int'l Comm'n of
Inquiry on Darfur].
253. Id. 461.
254. Lipscomb, supra note 25, at 191-92; Kastner, supra note 179, at 161.
255. Cryer, supra note 252, at 199; see also S.C. Res., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1556 (July 30, 2004).
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sovereignty and ongoing economic interests meant the Security Council only
provided for a limited arms embargo that failed to include the government, and
therefore, the Janjaweed, but did not impose economic sanctions or support
intervention on humanitarian grounds.256 When these measures were largely
ineffective, 257 it established a Commission of Inquiry, 258 which recommended that
the Security Council refer the matter to the ICC on the basis that prosecution
outside of the locus delicti "might ensure a neutral atmosphere and prevent the
trials from stirring up political, ideological or other passions., 259 The impossibility
of domestic trials, it reasoned, was demonstrated by the insufficient findings of the
Sudanese National Commission of Inquiry, which lacked impartiality because it
was under pressure to present a view favorable to the government. 260 The Security
Council referred the matter to the ICC in March 2005.261 On June 6th, the
Prosecutor opened an investigation into the situation, noting that it would "form
part of a collective effort, complementing African Union and other initiatives
[including traditional African mechanisms] to end the violence in Darfur and to
promote justice.
262
In response to the referral, the Sudanese government created the Darfur
Special Criminal Court to prosecute crimes against humanity in June 2005.263 The
ICC Prosecutor indicated that he would monitor its role,264 but it soon became
apparent that the Court would not meet the test of genuineness .265
The unwillingness of the Sudanese government to genuinely resolve the
situation was further demonstrated by the Darfur Peace Agreement negotiated by
the Sudanese government in May 2006 in Abuja.266 The agreement failed largely
because the government insisted that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for the
North-South conflict define the boundaries of the Darfur agreement, which left
little room for negotiation and indicated that the government held on to the
256. Kastner, supra note 179, at 162-63; see also Lipscomb, supra note 25, at 192 (stating that
ongoing economic interests include oil interests (of three members) and arms deals by four of the
permanent members of the Security Council).
257. Kastner, supra note 179, at 162-63.
258. Cryer, supra note 252, at 200; see also S.C. Res. 1564, 12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1564 (Sept. 18,
2004).
259. Cryer, supra note 252, at 201, 203.
260. Int'l Comm'n of Inquiry on Darfur, supra note 254, at 462.
261. S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005).
262. Press Release, ICC, The Prosecutor of the ICC opens investigations in Darfur, ICC-OTP-
0606-104 (June 6, 2005), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/exeres/31F3684F-43BC-4D5E-9EOA-
A6A8DAC308EB.htm.
263. Totten & Tyler, supra note 247, at 1096.
264. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Second Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to
the UN Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593, 2-3 (Dec. 13, 2005), available at http://www2.icc-
cpi.intlNR/rdonlyres/2CFC 123-B4DF-4FEB-BEF4-
52E0CAC8AA79/0/LMOUNSC ReportB En.pdft see also Cryer, supra note 252, at 220 (quoting
Luis Moreno-Ocampo).
265. See id. at 5-6. As of Spring 2007, the court had prosecuted only thirteen low level offenders
for crimes not of the "same gravity or magnitude as the crimes charged in the [ICC Prosecutor's
indictments]." Totten & Tyler, supra note 247, at 1096.
266. Kastner, supra note 179, at 163.
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possibility of a military victory.267 As a result the JEM and some factions of the
SLA (which had splintered by then) did not sign it,268 which the government used
as a justification to attack them.2 69 The Prosecutor consequently obtained arrests
warrants for Ahmad Harun, 270 Ali Kushayb, 27 1 and al-Bashir on multiple counts of
crimes against humanity, two counts of war crimes, and genocide.272 Despite the
arrest warrants, al-Bashir and his party were re-elected in 2010 amidst claims of
electoral fraud.273
Two key factors hinder peace in Darfur. First, there are few clear lines
dividing the various groups involved in the conflict. The Darfur agreement led to
infighting in the rebel groups, and division between them and the Darfurian
population.274 Some Arab tribes remained neutral or supported the government for
strategic reasons and some have fought amongst themselves over land.2 75 There are
accounts of Janjaweed fighters switching sides and attacking government forces,
possibly for fear of being used as scapegoats by them.276 The interchange and
division between groups supports the finding that the divide is a political rather
than an ethnic one. Second, the Darfur situation cannot be isolated from the
conflicts in the east and south of Sudan that were not subject to referral by the
Security Council.277 The peace agreements to which these conflicts are subject also
exclude significant sections of society located in the periphery which have been
267. Sarah M. H. Nouwen, Sudan's Divided (and Divisive?) Peace Agreement, 19 HAGUE Y.B.
INT'L L.113, 117 (2006).
268. Kastner, supra note 179, at 163.
269. Nouwen, supra note 269, at 117.
270. Prosecutor v. Ahmad Muhammad Harun and Ali Muhammad Al Abd-al-Rahman, Case No.
ICC-02/05-01/07, Warrant of Arrest for Ahmad Harun (Apr. 27, 2007), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc279813.PDF.
271. Prosecutor v. Ahmad Muhammad Harun and Ali Muhammad Al Abd-al-Rahman, Case No.
ICC-02/05-01/07, Warrant of Arrest for Ali Kushayb (Apr. 27, 2007), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc279858.PDF. Harun is the former Minister of State for the Interior of the
Government of Sudan and Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs of Sudan, and Ali Kushayb
alleged leader of the Janjaweed.
272. Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad al-
Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Public Document Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al
Bashir (Mar. 4, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc639078.pdf. On February 3, 2010, the
Appeals Chamber overturned the decision of the Pre-trial Chamber to exclude the charge of genocide.
Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Almad al-Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-OA, Judgment on Appeal of
the Prosecutor against the "Decision on the Prosecution's Application for Warrant of Arrest Against
Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir" (Feb. 3, 2010).
273. Jeffrey Gettleman, Bashir Wins Election as Sudan Edges Towards Split, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26,
2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/27/world/africa/27sudan.html?scp=3&sq=sudano2Oelection&st-cse;
Rigged Elections in Darfur and the Consequences of a Probable NCP Victory in Sudan, Africa Briefing
N172, INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP (Mar. 30, 2010), http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/
horn-of-africa/sudan/b072-rigged-elections-in-darfur-and-the-consequences-of-a-probable-ncp-victory-
in-sudan.aspx.
274. Kastner, supra note 179, at 163; Nouwen, supra note 269, at 118.
275. Kastner, supra note 179, at 160.
276. Cash, supra note 252, at 575; Kastner, supra note 179, at 164.
277. Nouwen, supra note 269, at 123; see also Cryer, supra note 252, at 197.
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marginalized, exploited, and subject to the "divide and rule" policies of the
Sudanese government. 278 Comprehensive peace in Sudan requires much more than
peace in Darfur. It is convincingly posited by some that what is required in Sudan
is regime change, 27 9 a goal which was not discussed in negotiations. The
indictment had positive and negative effects on the conflict in Darfur. On the one
hand, it put international pressure on al-Bashir and the Sudanese government and
reinforced the norm that no one is above the law, whether incumbent head of state
or not. On the other, it served to ensure al-Bashir would do everything he could to
maintain power to avoid arrest. The UN Special Envoy for Sudan argued that the
Security Council should consider the impact that an arrest warrant might have on
the implementation of North-South Peace Agreement of 2005.280 The African
Union, the Arab League, and China called on the Security Council to intervene,
arguing that an arrest warrant would complicate the peace process in Sudan and
that "the need for justice should not override the need for peace. 281 Costa Rica's
Security Council representative, Jorge Urdina, responded that the peace and justice
debate is a "false dilemma," and that the Security Council "supports peace and
justice" through referring the case to the ICC.2 82 The Security Council declined to
vote on the matter, and an arrest warrant was issued on March 4th, 2009.283 In
response, al-Bashir suspended the operation of aid groups, leaving many
Darfurians and IDPs without access to food, water, or health care services, 284 and
there were subsequent reports of attacks on foreign aid workers.285 The arrest
warrants also had the effect of drumming up the support of the local population,
although, notably, only in Khartoum. 286 The conflict was complicated by a dispute
between Sudan and Chad in which each side accused the other of "aiding rebels to
topple their respective governments. '287 An agreement to "normalize relations"
signed between the respective governments in Doha in May 2009 was
278. Nouwen, supra note 269, at 119.
279. See Nouwen, supra note 269.
280. See Marlise Simons & Neil MacFarquhar, Court Orders Arrest Warrant for Sudan's Leader,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/05/world/africa/05court.html.
281. Arrest warrant draws Sudan scorn, BBC ONLINE, Mar. 5, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/africa17924982.stm.
282. Sudan Warns of Ramifications if al-Bashir Arrested, THAINDIAN NEWS, Feb. 5, 2009,
http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/world-news/sudan-warns-of-ramifications-if-al-bashir-
arrested 100151716.html.
283. Court Orders Arrest Warrant for Sudan's Leader, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/05/world/africa/05court.html.
284. UN Pleads with Sudan Over Aid Ban, BBC NEWS, Mar. 5, 2009, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/africa/7925509.stm.
285. Sarah El Deeb, Aid Groups in Darfur Weigh Future After Kidnapping, MAIL AND GUARDIAN
ONLINE, Mar. 15, 2009, http://www.mg.co.za/article/2009-03-15-aid-groups-in-darfur-weigh-future-
after-kidnapping.
286. Peter Martell, Warrant Sparks Anger in Khartoum, BBC ONLINE, Mar. 4, 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7924324.stm; Arrest Warrant Draws Sudan Scorn, BBC ONLINE,
Mar. 5, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7924982.stm.
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subsequently breached;288 collapse of the agreement would serve to complicate and
exacerbate the conflict in Darfur.
B. Uganda
Uganda has a long history of repression. British Colonial rule was followed
by Milton Obote's dictatorial rule from 1962, Major-General Idi Amin's military
rule from 1971, and a return to Obote rule in 1980.289 The rigged elections
returning Obote to power sparked a six-year civil war between Acholi forces in the
north (representing the government) and the National Resistance Army led by
Yoweri Kaguta Museveni in the south.290 In a military coup in 1986, Museveni
gained control of the capital. 291 In 1996, he banned political parties, and the one-
party system was extended by referendum in 2000.292 Following the 1986 coup,
Joseph Kony formed the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) to fight the Museveni led
government29 ' and from its Sudanese base, started targeting the local population in
northern Uganda.294 Its members allegedly committed crimes against humanity and
war crimes, including abduction, murder, rape, attacks on IDP camps, torture,
forcible relocation, and child recruitment and enslavement. 295 The conflict caused
the death of around 100,000 civilians and the displacement of up to two million.
296
The LRA does not have a popular base of support because it targets civilians, and
abducts and conscripts children.297 According to some sources, the LRA leadership
contains around 150 to 200 commanders, with the remaining 1000 to 3000
members consisting of abducted children.298
In 2000 the Ugandan government passed the Amnesty Act in an attempt to
abate the conflict. 299 Blanket amnesty was granted to those engaged in "war or
288. Id
289. O'Shea, supra note 11, at 39.
290. Id.
291. Id; see also Cecily Rose, Looking Beyond Amnesty and Traditional Justice Mechanisms in
Northern Uganda: A Proposal for Truth-Telling and Reparations, 28 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 345, 348
(2008).
292. O'Shea, supra note 11, at 40.
293. MURPHY, supra note 64, at 2-3.
294. Akhavan, supra note 155, at 406-07; William W. Burke-White & Scott Kaplan, Shaping the
Contours of Domestic Justice: The International Criminal Court and an Admissibility Challenge in the
Uganda Situation, in THE EMERGING PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 80 (Carsten
Stahn & G6ran Sluiter Eds., 2009). The conflict was complicated by Sudan's support of the LRA and
Uganda's support of SLAIM. MacMillan, supra note 126, at 202. While government support of rebel
forces purportedly ceased subject to a bilateral agreement in 2002, the conflicts in both states did not
abate. Rose, supra note 293, at 349. Ajoint Sudanese-Ugandan Operation "Iron Fist" purportedly made
matters worse "when the LRA returned to northern Uganda for retaliatory and food-seeking attacks on
the civilian population." MURPHY, supra note 64, at 21-22.
295. Burke-White & Kaplan, supra note 296, at 80.
296. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Presidential Statement Demands Release of
Women, Children by Lord's Resistance Army, Expeditious Conclusion of Peace Process, U.N. Press
Release SC/8869 (Nov. 16, 2006).
297. Akhavan, supra note 155, at 407; Rose, supra note 294, at 349.
298. Rose, supra note 293, at 349.
299. Amnesty Act 2000 (Uganda); see also Rose, supra note 293, at 353. President Museveni had
proclaimed general amnesties prior to this. O'Shea, supra note 11, at 39.
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armed rebellion" against the government for acts committed between January 16th,
1986 and the expiry of the Act.30 0 Amnesty prevents criminal 30 1 prosecution for all
offences provided the participant reports to the authorities, renounces and
abandons involvement in the rebellion, and surrenders their weapons.30 2 An
Amnesty Committee was established to "consider and promote appropriate
reconciliation mechanisms in the affected areas," "promote dialogue and
reconciliation within the spirit of [the] Act," "monitor progra[ms] of
demobilization, reintegration[,] and resettlement of 'reporters,"' and "co-ordinate a
progra[m] of sensitization of the general public. 30 3 The Committee was neither
required nor empowered to investigate any conduct for which an amnesty is
granted.30 4 The Act was generally supported by the population and by non-
government organizations and various states as a mechanism for reconciliation.3 5
It resulted in around 21,000 reporters surrendering arms and renouncing the
LRA,30 6 but failed to attract high-level commanders.30 7 It therefore failed to
achieve its primary preambular objectives of facilitating peace and democracy
30 8
because the structure and mandate of the LRA remained intact, and violence
continued after a short period of abatement.30 9
In December 2003, President Museveni referred the situation to the ICC.
310
The ICC issued arrest warrants for Joseph Kony and four other senior figures,
Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo, Dominic Ongwen, and the now deceased Raska
Lukwiay, 311 on multiple counts of crimes against humanity and war crimes. 12 The
300. Amnesty Act 2000 § 3 (Uganda).
301. O'Shea, supra note 11, at 41.
302. Amnesty Act 2000 §§ 4(1)(a)-(c) (Uganda); see also Rose, supra note 293, at 353.
303. Amnesty Act 2000 §§ 9(a)-(d) (Uganda); O'Shea, supra note 11, at 42.
304. MURPHY, supra note 64, at 21.
305. Akhavan, supra note 155, at 409; Rose, supra note 293, at 353.
306. This number is as of December 2006. Rose, supra note 293, at 354.
307. Akhavan, supra note 155, at 410.
308. The democracy sought was nevertheless a "particular brand of democracy" that would
maintain Museveni's power. O'Shea, supra note 11, at 40.
309. Akhavan, supra note 155, at 409. This may be due, in part, to the limitations of the amnesty
process, which include limited ability to reintegrate combatants into the community, targeting of
reporters by the LRA, and poor conditions in IDP camps (such that reporters returned to combat). Rose,
supra note 293, at 357-58.
310. MacMillan, supra note 126, at 205. The Ugandan government referral of only LRA crimes
was heavily criticized. The ICC did not limit its jurisdiction to the LRA and has conducted
investigations into the violations allegedly committed by the Ugandan People's Defense Forces. Despite
initial protests, as far as is possible to ascertain the Ugandan government has not attempted to prevent it
from doing so. See Akhavan, supra note 155, at 411; MacMillan, supra note 126, at 203-04; MURPHY,
supra note 64, at 3; O'Shea, supra note 11, at 39-4 1.
311. Each respectively alleged: Commander-in-Chief of the LRA, Vice-Chairman and Second-in-
Command, Deputy Army Commander and Brigade Commander of Trinkle and Stockree Brigades,
Brigade Commander of the Sinia Brigade, and alleged Deputy Army Commander.
312. See Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-53, Warrant of Arrest (Jul. 8,
2005), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc97185.pdf (amended Sept. 27, 2005); Prosecutor v.
Vincent Otti, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-54, Warrant of Arrest (Jul. 8, 2005), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc97189.pdf; Prosecutor v. Okot Odhiambo, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-56,
Warrant of Arrest (Jul. 8, 2005), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc97197.pdf; Prosecutor v.
2011
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
LRA allegedly responded to the indictments by burning villages and IDP camps,
killing at least 337 people.313 After issuance of arrest warrants in October 2005, the
LRA attacked foreign aid workers, killing at least six people.314 However, the UN
reported that, after a period of renewed violence, matters improved.315 The ICC
Prosecutor submitted that the arrest warrants also led to an overall decrease in
violence in northern Uganda:
316
The Court's intervention has galvanized the activities of the states
concerned.... Thanks to the unity of purpose of these states, the LRA has
been forced to flee its safe haven in southern Sudan and has moved its
headquarters to the DRC border.
As a consequence, crimes allegedly committed by the LRA in
Northern Uganda have drastically decreased.... The loss of their safe
haven led the LRA commanders to engage in negotiations, resulting in a
cessation of hostilities agreement in August 2006.
3 17
The reduction in violence, albeit swinging, was linked to the advantages the
referral offered Museveni. It posed a credible threat of prosecution by raising the
conflict's international profile and transferring the political and economic costs of
prosecution to international actors.318 Not only did referral and subsequent arrest
warrants lead to the LRA's political and military isolation and incapacitation,3 19
but resultant international pressure meant both sides had to genuinely participate in
peace talks. Negotiations in Juba began on July 14th, 2006,320 resulting in an
agreement to cease hostilities that took effect on August 29th, 2006 and was
revised on November 1, 2006 after renewed violence.
321
While the arrest warrants served to compel negotiation, they were also a
stumbling block because LRA was soon negotiating for a withdrawal of the arrest
warrants in return for peace.322 The Prosecutor refused to bow to pressure on the
Dominic Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-57, Warrant of Arrest (Jul. 8, 2005), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc97201.pdf; Prosecutor v. Raska Lukwiya, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-55,
Warrant of Arrest for Raska Lukwiya (Jul. 8, 2005), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc97193.pdf.
313. MacMillan, supra note 126, at 233.
314. Id. at 205.
315. Akhavan, supra note 155, at 418 (quoting U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs, Uganda 2005: Consolidated Appeals Process, 5 (Nov. 2004), available at
http://ochadms.unog.ch/quickplace/cap/main.nsf/h-lndex/CAP-2005 Uganda/$FILE/CAP 2005 Ugan
daSCREEN.PDF?OpenElement).
316. Burke-White & Kaplan, supra note 296, at 81; Rose, supra note 293, at 350.
317. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the Int'l Criminal Court, Opening Remarks, Fifth
Session of the Assembly of State Parties, at 2-3 (Nov. 23, 2006), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.intINR/rdonlyres/AOF5C933-65AC-4621-B607-C3F25DOC22B7/278557/LMO_20061123 en.pdf.
318. Burke-White & Kaplan, supra note 296, at 80-81. It also made support for the LRA more
costly for Sudan. Akhavan, supra note 155, at 416-17; Burke-White & Kaplan, supra note 296, at 80-
81.
319. Akhavan, supra note 155, at 404.
320. MacMillan, supra note 126, at 206.
321. U.N. Press Release SC/8869, supra note 298.
322. Burke-White & Kaplan, supra note 296, at 82.
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basis that withdrawal was inconsistent with the Rome Statute.3 23 In 2006, after
initially promising immunity from ICC prosecution, Museveni supported the arrest
warrants but extended the availability of amnesty for another two years.324 When
the arrest warrants were not withdrawn, Kony offered to submit cases to the
domestic jurisdiction as an alternative.325 In June 2007, the LRA and the Ugandan
government agreed to a range of accountability measures, including domestic civil
and criminal prosecutions, traditional justice mechanisms, 326 and a range of
alternative sentences reflecting the gravity of the crimes and seeking to promote
reconciliation, rehabilitation, and reparations.327 The 2007 agreement was bolstered
by further discussions in February 2008, which led to an agreement for the
establishment of a "special division of the High Court of Uganda... to try
individuals who are alleged to have committed serious crimes during the
conflict,' '328 " planned or carried out widespread, systematic, or serious attacks
directed against civilians or... committed grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions., 329 The agreement also provides that the government will examine
traditional justice mechanisms and establish a truth-seeking body akin to the truth
and reconciliation commissions of Sierra Leone and South Africa.330
While these have been significantly positive developments, settlement
discussions are still ongoing and a conclusion to the conflict remains "elusive.
331
This is partly because "Kony and Otti have no serious interest in negotiations
except perhaps as a means of buying time when under pressure. 332 Prosecutor
Moreno-Ocampo argues that Kony strategically uses peace negotiations to avoid
arrest and prosecution when he is in a weak position, and returns to violence when
strengthened.333 The commission of serious crimes therefore continues. In
December and January, the LRA abducted and massacred hundreds of civilians
and children.334 In February 2009, the government launched a US backed offensive
323. Id. at 82-83.
324. Burke-White & Kaplan, supra note 296, at 104; MacMillan, supra note 126, at 205-06. As
will be noted later, Museveni did not have the power to withdraw the referral and his only option is to
bring a challenge to the arrest warrants in the Pre-Trial Chamber on the basis that the matters are
inadmissible under article 17 of the Rome Statute.
325. MacMillan, supra note 126, at 206.
326. Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation Between the Government of the Republic of
Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army/Movement, Uganda-Sudan, 4.1 (June 29, 2007),
http://www.beyondjuba.org/peace agreements/Agreement on AccountabilityAnd Reconcilition.pdf.
327. Burke-White & Kaplan, supra note 296, at 82-84.
328. Annexure to the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation, Uganda-Sudan, 7 (Feb.
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aiming to crush the LRA, which was hiding in northern Congo.335 The plan
backfired when the leaders escaped and the LRA splintered into small groups that
went through towns "in northeastern Congo hacking, burning, shooting and
clubbing to death anyone in their way., 336 Despite poor planning being responsible
for many of the operation's failures, the reaction of the LRA demonstrates that
neither amnesty, nor threat of prosecution, has prevented the continuing
commission of atrocities.337 The Ugandan government maintains that, since Kony




Conflict erupted in Sierra Leone when Liberian forces, accompanied by the
Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
(AFRC), and forces from Guinea, Burkina Faso, and Libya, invaded the diamond
fields in the remote east of the country.3 9 The resultant war was brutal. Atrocities,
including mass rape, sexual slavery, forced rape of family members, child
abduction, torture, killing of civilians, maiming (by cutting off arms, legs, ears, and
lips), and mass displacement,3 40 resulted in the physical and psychological scarring
of a significant section of the population. 341 The RUF, the dominant rebel group,
did not "articulate... a political agenda other than ousting successive
,342governments. '  It is nevertheless largely accepted that rampant corruption,
centralization of government, unemployment, and "ethnocization of national
policies" were causal factors in the conflict.
3 43
In November 1996, the RUF and President Kabbah's Sierra Leone's Peoples
Party (SLPP) signed the Abidjan Peace Accord, which provided that, in return for
peace and disarmament, members of the RUF would not be prosecuted, all political
prisoners would be released, and the RUF would be afforded the opportunity to
transform itself into a political party with representation before domestic bodies. 3 "
Nevertheless, the RUF continued to perpetrate atrocities against the civilian
335. Jeffrey Gettlemen & Eric Schmitt, US. Aided a Failed Plan to Rout Ugandan Rebels, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 7, 2009, www.nytimes.com/2009/02/07/world/africa/07congo.html?hp=&pagewanted
=print.
336. Id
337. Albeit that they were subject to attack and, perhaps, had the government maintained a
ceasefire in favor of peace negotiations (albeit with the adverse effect of strengthening LRA forces), the
volume of atrocities might have been less.
338. Gettlemen & Schmitt, supra note 337.
339. David Crane, The Politics of International Criminal Law: The West African Experience A
Case Study: Operation Justice in Sierra Leone 3 (Crimes Against Humanity Initiative Experts'
Meeting, Washington University, St. Louis, Working Paper, 2009) (on file with the author).
340. Nsongurua Udombana, Globalization of Justice and the Special Court for Sierra Leone's War
Crimes, 17 EMORY. INT'L L. REv. 55, 73-74 (2003).
341. Id. at 74.
342. Id at 72.
343. Id at 70-71.
344. Daniel. J. Macaluso, Absolute and Free Pardon: The Effect of the Amnesty Provision in the
Lomd Peace Agreement on the Jurisdiction of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 27 BROOK. J. INT'L L.
347, 349 (2001); Udombana, supra note 342, at 74-75.
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population. In 1997 the AFRC staged a coup, but was ousted in 1998 by the
Security Council endorsed Economic Community of West African States
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and President Kabbah was restored to power.345
When the government was again overthrown in 1999, Kabbah returned to the
negotiation table under international pressure.346 On July 7th, 1999, the
government, the RUF and the AFRC signed the Lomd Accord.347 It transformed
the RUF into a political party whose members would be appointed to public office
and cabinet.34 8 It also granted Foday Sankoh, the RUF leader, an explicit pardon,
34 9
gave "absolute and free pardon and reprieve to all combatants and collaborators in
respect of anything done by them,, 350 and provided for the creation of a Truth and
Reconciliation Commission (the SLTRC).35 1 The agreement stated that amnesty
was granted "[t]o consolidate the peace and promote the cause of national
reconciliation., 352 Prior to the agreement, prosecutions and executions had taken
place for actions related to the 1997 coup.35 3 The RUF had therefore faced a real
threat of prosecution. 4 It was clear to all parties that the RUF, and Foday Sankoh
in particular, would not have signed the agreement without amnesty. 355 According
to Hayner, there was local support for amnesty provided it led to cessation of
violence,356 but the international community condemned it. The Special
Representative for the UN was instructed at the last minute to insert a reservation
declaring that the amnesty would not apply to genocide, crimes against humanity,
war crimes, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law.357
Foday Sankoh was not aware of the reservation until after he signed the
document.
35 8
Constraining amnesty by imposing conditions on its availability was never
seriously considered.3 5 9 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000
(SLTRC Act) provided a forum for perpetrators and victims to tell their stories
345. Macaluso, supra note 346, at 349; Udombana, supra note 342, at 76-78.
346. Macaluso, supra note 346, at 350; Udombana, supra note 342, at 78.
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Front of Sierra Leone, arts. II-V, Jul. 7, 1999, http://www.sierra-leone.org/lomeaccord.html [hereinafter
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349. Id. at art. IX, 1.
350. Id. at art. IX, 2.
351. Id. at art. XXVI.
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(2004).
358. HAYNER, supra note 355, at 6.
359. Id. at 13-19.
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without offering the carrot of amnesty. 360 The SLTRC aimed, among other things,
"to address impunity.... to promote healing and reconciliation and to prevent a
repetition of the violations and abuses suffered., 361 The SLTRC could "investigate
all or any abuses and violations of human rights and international humanitarian law
related to the armed conflict in Sierra Leone. 362
Ongoing disputes between the parties led to a breakdown of the ceasefire,
resurgence in violence, and repeated violations of the terms of the Accord.363
When it became clear that the "RUF had no intention of allowing peace to reign in
Sierra Leone and, in particular, letting the UN take control of the country's
,,164diamond-rich areas, an agreement between the United Nations and Sierra
Leone,365 ratified pursuant to the Special Court Agreement (Ratification) Act 2002,
established the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) with a mandate to try those
"who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international
humanitarian law and the laws of Sierra Leone. 366
While conducting investigations, the Prosecutor of the SCSL and his team
determined that it would be necessary to arrest all indictees simultaneously
"because arresting the key players one at a time would be political suicide"; the
indictees might rally support, return to violence, and secure their positions so as to
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J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1082, 1083-85 (2004) (stating that despite concurrent operation and significant
overlaps in jurisdiction, neither the SLTRC Act nor the SC Statute made specific reference to the other;
the Prosecutor of the SCSL, David Crane, merely indicated his intention not to use the resources of the
SLTRC); see also Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-2003-08-PT, Decision on the Request of the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone to conduct a public hearing with Samuel Hinga
Norman, 10-16 (Oct. 29, 2003), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl/Public/SCSL-03-08-
Norman/SCSL-03-08-PT-049/SCSL-03-08-PT-049-I.pdf; Prosecutor v. Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-
PT, Appeal by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Accused against the Decision of Judge
Bankole Thompson, Delivered on November 3, 2003 to Deny the TRC's Request to hold a public
hearing with Augustine Gbao (May 7, 2004) (showing that as result, primacy was never subject to
legislation or agreement and was therefore a causal factor in disputes over amnesty), available at
http://www.sc-sl.org/scslIndictments/SCSL-04-15-PT%/o20RUF%/o201ndictment.pdf; see also Prosecutor
v. Kallon, Case No. SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E), Decision to challenge jurisdiction, 42-44, 48-49, 61-
62, 72, 84 (Mar. 13, 2004), available at http://www.transcrim.org/07 o20SCSL o20-%o202004%o20-
%20Kallon 0 o20Kamara; Prosecutor v. Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Judgment, 14 (Aug. 2,
2007), available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?docid=46e123dc2&page
=search.
VOL. 39:2
BRINGING PEACE TO DARFUR AND UGANDA
prevent arrest. 367 The covert operation, coined "Operation Justice," involved the
cooperation of several local, regional, and international actors including diplomats,
the Chief of Staff of the UN peacekeeping force, and the Inspector-General of the
Sierra Leone National Police. 368 The indictments and arrest warrants were sealed,
and all indictees (with the exception of Charles Taylor) were arrested
simultaneously on March 10th, 2003, without a shot fired.369 While serious
problems persist, including corruption, serious rule of law deficiencies, and a poor
human rights record,370 mass violence has been abated thus far and, as according to
reports, the groups most responsible for the atrocities have been disabled.371
D. South Africa
The minority rule of the apartheid State was characterized by legalized racial
discrimination of groups defined "on a territorial, residential, political, social, and
economic basis" in all areas of life including land, housing, education, health, and
access to services and premises.372 The resultant conflict spanning four decades led
to extensive human rights violations, including arbitrary imprisonment, forced
displacement, denationalization, torture, disappearances, killings, and other human
rights violations.373 When oppression heightened in the 1970's and 1980's, the
African National Congress (ANC) established Umkhonto we Sizwe (literally
"spear of the nation"), a military wing engaged in guerrilla warfare.374 The
increasing public face of violence and resultant international pressure in the 1980s
led the National Party to abandon movement control laws, un-ban political parties,
and release political prisoners.3 75 In 1990, the National Party initiated secret
negotiations with ANC leader Nelson Mandela, 76 and Parliament enacted the
Indemnity Act,37 7 by which the President could pronounce oppressed persons
367. Crane, supra note 341, at 9-10.
368. Id. at 8-9.
369. Id. at 11-13.
370. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2009, COUNTRY SUMMARY: SIERRA LEONE 1 (Jan.
2009), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related-material/sierraleone.pdf.
371. Scott Worden & Emily Warm, Special Court of Sierra Leone Briefing: The Taylor Trial and
Lessons from Capacity-Building and Outreach, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE,
htp://www.usip.org/publications/special-court-sierra-leone-briefing-taylor-trial-and-lessons-capacity-
building-and-outreac (last visited Jan. 10, 2011).
372. Alex Boraine, Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa Amnesty: The Price of
Peace, in RETRIBUTION AND REPATRIATION IN THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY 299, 300 (Jon Elster
ed., 2006).
373. Motala, supra note 138, at 916.
374. Christopher C. Burris, Re-examining the Prisoner of War Status of PLO Fedayeen, 22 N.C.J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 943, 999 - 1000 (1997).
375. Daisy M. Jenkins, From Apartheid to Majority Rule: A Glimpse into South Africa's Journey
Towards Democracy, 13 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 463, 478 (1996).
376. Gavron, supra note 3, at 113.
377. Indemnity Act No. 35 of 1990, as amended by Indemnity Act No. 124 of 1992 (S. Aft.)
(replacing Indemnity Act No. 14 of 1961 and Indemnity Act No. 13 of 1977, which granted political
leaders and persons employed by the State amnesty from civil and criminal liability).
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indemnified for conduct if necessary for negotiation of peace.378 In democratic
elections in 1994, the ANC gained power and Mandela was elected president.379
Peace negotiations gave rise to a political compromise: free and fair elections
in exchange for conditional amnesty. 380 The 1993 Interim Constitution and the
SATRC Act provided that amnesty from civil and criminal liability381 could be
granted for offenses "associated with a political objective and committed in the
course of the conflicts of the past. 382 The SATRC granted amnesty to applicants
that gave "a full account of what they had done and the context within which it was
done," where their act was associated with a political objective.383 Accordingly,
applicants must have demonstrated that they "acted in support of a publicly known
political organization, the state, or in furtherance of a coup d'etat.,384 While
around 9,000 applications were received,385 the posited success of the judicial stick
and TRC carrot was limited by the very few applications received from
government operatives.
386
The SATRC was lauded in some quarters, and quietly accepted in others.387
Some praised the approach as a domestic solution, based on "the African notion of
ubuntu, which explicitly excludes retribution and favors restorative justice. 388
Others were more pragmatic in their support. Senior generals of the security forces
warned that "dire consequences [would result] if members of those forces had to
face compulsory trials and prosecutions after the election., 389 Some, like
Archbishop Desmond Tutu, the SATRC Chairperson, and Justice Richard
Goldstone,39 ° were convinced that criminal trials like Nuremberg were not
appropriate because they would have been sabotaged by security forces and right
wing groups, and negotiations would have broken down. 91 In the middle of the
spectrum, the UN General Assembly was silent on amnesty despite having
378. O'Shea, supra note 11, at 44.
379. Gavron, supra note 3, at 113.
380. Boraine, supra note 374, at 315.
381. Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act No. 34 of 1995 § 20(7)(A) (S. Afr.)
[hereinafter SATRC Act].
382. Gavron, supra note 3, at 113.
383. O'Shea, supra note 11, at 45.
384. SATRC Act § 20(2); see also O'Shea, supra note 11, at 43.
385. Minow, supra note 146, at 178 (noting that only a few hundred of these were granted
amnesty).
386. Boraine, supra note 374, at 308; Dugard, supra note 15, at 1011.
387. Minow, supra note 146, at 179.
388. Wafula Okumu, Human Rights in Transition Societies: The Cases of Somalia and South
Africa, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIETIES IN TRANSITION 291, 309 (Shale Horowitz & Albrecht
Schnabel eds., 2004).
389. Boraine, supra note 374, at 302.
390. Former South African Constitutional Court Judge, Chief Prosecutor for the International
Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and Chair of the Commission of Inquiry
Regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation.
391. Gavron, supra note 3, at 115; Boraine, supra note 374, at 302.
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* 392previously called for prosecutions. There were nevertheless many who opposed
amnesty, so much so that they brought an unsuccessful constitutional challenge.393
On the one hand, supporters of the SATRC were vindicated. According to
Black, "South Africa's transition from racial authoritarianism of the apartheid era
to the non-racial democratic institutions and entrenched constitutional rights of the
post-1994 period is... one of the great human rights triumphs of the post-Second
World War era. 394 This is undoubtedly due the significant role the SATRC played
in airing dirty laundry, identifying those responsible, establishing a historical
record to prevent future denials, offering a forum for victims and their families to
be given a voice, and providing some form of financial reparations to those most
affected by apartheid policies. 395 The success of the transition must also be
attributed to the exemplary role played by senior figures such as Mandela in
396adopting a conciliatory, forgiving, and pragmatic position in peace negotiations.
On the other hand, whether the model will play a real and lasting contribution
in combating impunity in South Africa is yet to be seen. Its intention was that those
who were not granted amnesty would be subject to investigation, and possibly
prosecution, by the South African National Prosecuting Authority (NPA).3 97 Since
the close of its operations, and despite referral of around 900 cases, only a handful
have been subject to investigation and prosecution, and many of those have been
unsuccessful or unsatisfactory. 39' The NPA's reluctance to pursue apartheid crimes
has been apparent since the completion of the SATRC's work. In 2002, then
President Mbeki granted pardon to thirty-three persons who fought against
392. G.A. Res. 48/159, 3, U.N. Doc. AIRES/48/159 (Dec. 20, 1993); Gavron, supra note 3, at
115.
393. AZAPO v. President of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (4) SA 671 (CC) at 36 (S. Afr.);
Boraine, supra note 374, at 308; Gavron, supra note 3, at 114 (noting critiques of the model, including
that it did not differentiate between perpetration of and resistance to apartheid or "acknowledge the
essential criminality of apartheid," and that its temporal jurisdiction was too limited).
394. Wafula Okumu, supra note 390, at 291, 303 (citing David Black, The Long and Winding
Road: International Norms and Domestic Political Change in South Africa, in THE POWER OF HUMAN
RIGHTS - INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE (Thomas Risse et al eds., 1999)).
395. Lorie M. Graham, Reparations, Self-Determination, and the Seventh Generation, 21 HARv.
HUM. RTS. J. 47, 84 (2008).
396. Jenkins, supra note 377, at 490.
397. Ward Ferdinandusse, The Grave Breaches Regime in the Geneva Conventions: A
Reassessment Sixty Years On, 7 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 723, 733 (2009).
398. INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, RESEARCH BRIEF: COUNTRY CASE
STUDIES ON THE USE OF PARDONS 13 (Nov. 2008), available at http://www.ictj.org/static/Americas/
ICTJResearch Brief-Countrycase studies on the use of pardons.pdf. In the recent prosecution of
Adrian Vlok, the former Minister of Law and Order, the NPA agreed to a plea bargain in which Vlok
was awarded a five year suspended sentence, despite that his Department played a central role in the
formulation of policies that constituted, or led to the commission of, human rights violations. It is
concerning that they bowed to a lenient sentence in one of the only recent cases to be brought against a
political leader, who had confessed to approving the poisoning of former church leader Frank Chikane.
One of the only successful prosecutions against a senior official took place in 1996 against Eugene de
Kock, a police Colonel and Commander of the notorious Vlakplaas hit squad. De Kock Trial to
Conclude on Wednesday, S. AFRICAN PRESS ASS'N (Oct. 29, 1996), http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/
media/1996/96 10/s961029m.htm.
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apartheid, some of whom had either applied for amnesty and been rejected or been
convicted of murder.399 In 2005, the NPA issued guidelines for prosecuting
apartheid era offenses, which allow the Minister to grant amnesty, without
publication, under specified conditions.40 0 While the factors that may be taken into
account are substantially similar to those considered by the TRC, the Minister may
also consider whether the NPA has the resources to investigate and prosecute the
matter.40 1 In a successful Constitutional Court challenge to the policy40 2 the South
African High Court found that it amounted to an unlawful "copy or duplication" of
the TRC amnesty process 40 3 because the NPA is under a constitutional obligation
to prosecute when there is sufficient evidence to do so, many of the criteria were
irrelevant to deciding whether to prosecute, 40 4 and the policy infringed victims'
constitutional rights, such as the rights to life, dignity, freedom, equality, and
security of the person.40 5 Despite the finding, the NPA's inability to prosecute is
likely to be decisive. In a conference held by the Institute for Justice and
Reconciliation in March 2006, Dr. J. P. Pretorius, an Advocate in the Priority
Crimes Litigation Unit in the Department of Justice, stated that the NPA did not
have investigators dedicated to apartheid era offenses and it was likely that not
more than half a dozen cases would be prosecuted.40 6
The success of amnesty must be considered in the current context of mass
violent crime, not connected to conflict but to a range of political, social, and
399. INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, RESEARCH BRIEF, COUNTRY CASE
STUDIES ON THE USE OF PARDONS 13 (Nov. 2008) available at http://www.ictj.org/static/
Americas/ICTJ Research Brief-Country case studies on the use of ardons.pdf Llewellyn, supra
note 92, at 214 (citing Joanna Ross, South African Amnesty Raises Storm, BBC NEWS ONLINE, May 19,
2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1997262.stm).
400. NPA Prosecution Policy, supra note 105, 3.
401. NPA Prosecution Policy, supra note 105, 4; see also NPA Prosecution Policy for Apartheid
Crimes Struck Down, LEGAL RESOURCES CENTRE (Dec. 12, 2008), http://www.lrc.org.za/press-
releases/261-2008-12-12-npa-prosecution-policy-for-apartheid-crimes-struck-down.
402. Nkadimeng v. Nat 'lDir. of Public Prosecutions 2008 ZAGPHC 422 15.5.4 (S. Aft.).
403. Id. T 15.4.3.1.
404. Id 77 15.4.4, 15.5.2, 15.5.3.
405. See id. T 36. The applicants' challenge included arguments pursuant to international law,
however the court declined deal with these in its judgment. The NPA's application for leave to appeal
was dismissed.in May 2009. Nkadimeng v. Nat'l Dir. of Public Prosecutions, Case 32079/07,
Application for leave to Appeal, Jan. 8, 2009 (S. Aft.); NPA Prosecution Policy for Apartheid Crimes:
State's application for leave to appeal, Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (May 4,
2009), available at http://www.csvr.org.za/index.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id=1092&
Itemid=206. In a separate but related matter, the Constitutional Court found that a 2007 policy on
presidential pardons was unconstitutional because it infringed the right to victim participation. Albutt v.
Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation [2010] ZACC 4 (S. Afr.); Judgment on Special
Pardons A Significant Victory for Victims' Rights, S. AFRICAN HISTORY ARCHVE (Feb. 23, 2010),
http://www.saha.org.za/news/2010/February/press statementjudgment on specialpardons a signific
ant victoryfor victims rights.htm.
406. Dr J. P. Pretorius, Advocate, National Prosecuting Authority, The Truth and Reconciliation
Commission: Ten years On, Cape Town, South Africa, (Apr. 20, 2006) (conference information
available with the author); see also Shaun Benton, Prosecutor Complains of Lack of Investigators Over
Apartheid-Era Crimes, allAfrica.com, Apr. 20, 2006, available at Westlaw, 4/20/06 allAfrica.com
17:32:06.
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economic factors.4 °7 Should some of the resources directed to the SATRC have
been directed to building the NPA's capacity to combat the conduct that has led to
one of the highest crime rates in the world? Did impunity breed impunity? Such
conclusions must be acknowledged as crude and unsophisticated. The TRC can be
credited with assisting to prevent lapse into civil war and some individuals' moves
from helplessness and persecution to relative hope and equality. However the
crudeness of the conclusion serves the point: do we really know what the long-
term outcome and impact of amnesty is on South Africa? Can we really say it
hasn't led to impunity? Can we accept that those most responsible have walked
free to live what may be comfortable lives without punishment?
III. AMNESTIES AND THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE
International law has not yet accommodated the political and social goals
underpinning amnesties and truth commissions in justice as a term of law.
Amnesties can only be upheld if the Prosecutor finds that the interests of justice do
and should accommodate political and social factors, and that there are substantial
reasons or a sufficient basis to show that they will contribute to peace and
reconcile the community. Should legal and policy reasons dictate an expansive or
restrictive approach? Is it the ICC's role to facilitate peace, or is it merely to punish
wrongdoing and prevent impunity?
A. The ICC and Politics: Adopting an Expansive Approach
The factors that may be taken into account under the expansive view may be
restricted by the inherent limitations in article 53 of the ICC Statute: the negative
nature of the burden and its application to the individual case rather than the
situation as a whole. In the interests of exploring the most expansive role that the
Prosecutor might adopt, the first two grounds apply only to the limited view, but
the remainder apply to all grounds that support conditional amnesties accompanied
by truth commissions.
Amnesty is a Persuasive Bargaining Chip
As demonstrated in South Africa, amnesty can be a useful bargaining chip in
peace negotiations.4 8 The Prosecutor may deter perpetrators from disarming or
contribute to the resumption of hostilities at the post-conflict stage, and therefore
the commission of more serious crimes, because he poses a real threat of arrest.
40 9
Deferring to amnesty might force leaders to make a choice between survival and
peace. While amnesty is not presently offered in Darfur, some posit that the
possibility of deterring violence in Darfur is now a "specious hope., 410 The arrest
warrant for al-Bashir has led to the withdrawal of humanitarian groups and
peacekeeping forces and the creation of a "nothing-to-lose" attitude among the
leaders of belligerent groups has "increase[ed] the incentive to ramp up the attacks
407. Graeme Simpson, Urban Crime and Violence in South Africa, in JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN:
CHALLENGES FOR POLICY AND PRACTICE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 66, 66-69 (Celia Petty & Maggy
Brown eds., 1998), available at http://www.csvr.org.za/wits/papers/papgsurb.htm.
408. Slye, supra note 179, at 198.
409. Scharf, supra note 58, at 342; Trumbull, supra note 179, at 314.
410. Kastner, supra note 179, at 165.
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and force[d] a final resolution by eliminating [civilians and rebel groups],
411
412arguably, strengthening al-Bashir's position. Uganda might support amnesty
where it can be shown that indictments have stalled peace; indeed the Ugandan
government attempted to persuade the Office of the Prosecutor to suspend the
indictments to allow domestic judicial processes to be put in place.413 Amnesty
might expedite the transition and "decrease the probability of the continuation of
human rights violations. 414
Deferring to Amnesty Reduces Uncertainty
The restrictive approach creates uncertainty for parties to peace negotiations
and results in the failure of amnesty as a bargaining chip.415 It might become a zero
sum game; greater prosecutions, less prospects for peace. Support for al-Bashir has
increased since he was indicted;41 6 certainly regional support has lessened support
for the ICC.4 17 The ICC might avoid this problem by sealing indictments and arrest
warrants such as Crane did in Sierra Leone, or waiting until peace negotiations are
relatively successful before investigating or prosecuting perpetrators.41 8 However,
over the long term it will become apparent that the ICC will not respect amnesty.419
Truth Commissions Advance Political Transformation
Conditional amnesty might "play a part in advancing the political
transformation" 420 of States by mobilizing institutions and actors to submit to an
accountability mechanism, identifying systemic causes of the conflict and actors
most responsible, and making recommendations for institutional reform. 421 The
identification of systemic causes and the self-examination that flows from truth
commissions "provides a critical buffer against repeated abuses" by demanding
"civic and social transformation needed to ensure that abuses are not repeated in
411. Id. at 178.
412. See Susanne Koelbl & Volkhard Windfuhr, Ifeel completely safe, SPIEGAL ONLINE (Mar. 22,
2010), http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,684941,00.html; but see As Sudanese elections
near, UN voices concern over reports of harassment, UN NEWS CENTRE, http://www.un.
org/apps/news/story.asp?NewslD=34172&Crnsudan&Crl=election (last visited Mar. 25, 2010)
(suggesting that the imminent elections will not be a fair indicator of whether this support translates into
democratic support, which is doubtful).
413. Kastner, supra note 179, at 179.
414. Gomez, supra note 179, at 62.
415. Trumbull, supra note 179, at 314.
416. See Koelbl & Volkhard, supra note 414; but see UN NEWS CENTRE, supra note 414.
417. See Koelbl & Volkhard, supra note 414.
418. Kastner, supra note 179, at 175 (asking whether the "international community should continue
to provide strong support for Prosecutor and only consider asking the court to suspend its activity when
and if the LRA leaders are begging to implement a fair settlement"') (quoting INTERNATIONAL CRISIS
GROUP, AFRICA REPORT No. 124, NORTHERN UGANDA: SEIZING THE OPPORTUNITY FOR PEACE 15
(Apr. 26, 2007), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfin?id=4791).
419. Although the impact on the second option might be reduced because it might provide
perpetrators with at least some hope that only the possibility of amnesty is worth the risk. In any event,
the benefits of complementarity would also be lost.
420. TEITEL, supra note 23, at 51.
421. Evenson, supra note 179, at 752-53. The benefits of conducting domestic trials may also
translate to such a process, including increased access for victims and to information.
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the future" 422 and "building a culture of respect for human rights. '423 There is little
doubt that international prosecutions fail to fulfill these goals on the domestic
level, if at all.42 4 Moreover, their deterrence capacity, which "is unclear at best,
425
has a limited ability to address collective consciousness that often leads to the
justification of unlawful conduct on a systemic or mass scale.426 Prosecutions can
hinder national reconciliation by isolating supporters of former regimes and
pushing them into hostile subcultures.427 The Ugandan model does not advance
political transformation because of its unconditional nature, its failure to ensure
victim participation, and its lack of investigatory procedure, while the SATRC
provides a more useful basis from which to develop a conditional amnesty
model.
428
Mass Atrocities, the Interests of Victims, and Recognition of Guilt
In situations in which mass atrocities have occurred, domestic and
international justice systems cannot investigate and punish all perpetrators.429
Truth Commissions offer an alternative that fulfills a number of goals. They
provide victims with a forum within which to tell their story, confront perpetrators,
and obtain reparation. They expose crimes, identify perpetrators, and reveal more
facts than the handful of prosecutions that might be conducted,430 and therefore
facilitate public condemnation, respect for victims' rights, and recognition of
guilt.431 Moreover, they ensure that perpetrators are accountable in some way432
and victims are afforded some redress through confrontation, participation, and
reparation.
Development of a Norm
Deferring to grants of amnesty would contribute, by default, to the
crystallization of a norm of international law in which amnesty would be a
recognized exception to a duty to prosecute provided it meets particular criteria.433
422. Id. at 753.
423. Minow, supra note 146, at 180; see also Newman, supra note 6, at 305.
424. Minow, supra note 146, at 177.
425. Id.
426. ERvIN STAUB, THE ROOTS OF EVIL: THE ORIGINS OF GENOCIDE AND OTHER GROUP
VIOLENCE 67 (1992).
427. Majzub, supra note 42, at 251.
428. See Young, supra note 144, at 465, 469 (suggesting criteria and conditions upon which a
model could be based).
429. See Newman, supra note 6, at 306; see also Majzub, supra note 42, at 251-52 (noting the
difficulty of prosecuting in situations in which perpetrators destroy evidence, which occurred on a mass
scale in South Africa).
430. Blumenson, supra note 179, at 862-63.
431. Id. at 863, 870.
432. Id. at 869; see also James L. Gibson, Truth Justice, and Reconciliation: Judging the Fairness
of Amnesty in South Africa, 46 AM. J. POL. SE. 540, 544 (2002) (quoting Justice Richard Goldstone
who stated that "amnesty applicants 'suffered a very real punishment' by the shame they suffered
following their public confessions").
433. Trumbull, supra note 179, at 317.
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The ICC could thereby be instrumental in determining that criteria and play a lead
role in ensuring that the model adopted meets the goals ofjustice.
State Control and Cultural Imperialism
A state is best placed to determine how justice mechanisms contribute to
conflict resolution and reconciliation because the needs of different societies
experiencing different conflicts will vary. Affording states latitude to determine
appropriate solutions to conflicts ensures their sovereignty is not overborne and
contributes to a broader notion of complementarity. Affording states latitude also
ensures that application of the Rome Statute does not lead to cultural imperialism,
in which western notions of criminal justice overcome more traditional and
alternative accountability mechanisms more commonly adopted by non-western
states. The international community's failure to defer to sovereignty in such
circumstances by insisting on prosecution can be viewed as a substitute for their
failure to intervene to stop the injury because it "is not worth the cost associated
with military intervention. 434 On the one hand, the importance of sovereignty has
lessened in the past two decades because the international community has
435acknowledged that infringements of human rights are of global concern.
However, states have failed to follow through with meaningful actions that prevent
atrocities.436 As a result, the cost of prosecution is placed on the victims and
communities of the conflicted state.437
Facilitating Information Exchanges
If the Prosecutor deferred to amnesty, he could still prosecute those who are
not granted amnesty. Truth Commissions and amnesties might facilitate
prosecutions through information exchange by providing the Prosecutor with lead
evidence that will assist him to target investigations and gather other information
necessary to build his case.438 They might also assist the Prosecutor to overcome
language constraints and difficulties collecting local evidence. 43 9 While the
information and evidence gathered by the SATRC could not be used as probative
434. Id. at 316.
435. Id. at 315.
436. Although states might prefer to retain their sovereignty and not wish for other states to
intervene uninvited.
437. Trumbull, supra note 179, at 316.
438. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 93(1), Jul. 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
(providing that States are required to cooperate with the Prosecutor by taking evidence and providing
records and documents, among other things) [hereinafter Rome Statute]; see Minow, supra note 146, at
179.
439. Rome Statute, art. 93 (envisaging cooperation between the ICC and the relevant state in regard
to the taking of evidence, questioning of persons, and the provision of records, including official
records and documents. Forensic and other evidence would also be useful to the ICC); Bruce M.
MacKay, A View from the Trenches: The Special Court for Sierra Leone - The First Year, 35 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 273, 280-81 (2003); see also Laura Hall & Nahal Kazemi, Prospects for Justice and
Reconciliation in Sierra Leone, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 287, 289 (2003); MARIEKE WIERDA, PRISCILLA
HAYNER, & PAUL VAN ZYL, EXPLORING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SPECIAL COURT AND THE
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SIERRA LEONE 6 (Int'l Cent. for Transitional Justice,
2002), available at http://www.ictj.org/images/content0/8/084.pdf.
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evidence in prosecutions, the NPA has nevertheless been able to use that
information as lead evidence. 440 This might assist the Prosecutor to expend
resources more appropriately on those most responsible. 441
B. The ICC and Law: Adopting a Restrictive Approach
Theoretically valid arguments are put forward for an expansive approach,
however, a restrictive approach is justified. Given the negative burden imposed on
the Prosecutor, the question to be answered is not whether it is in the interests of
justice to prosecute, but whether it is not. Accordingly, the following grounds set
out the reasons why the Prosecutor should determine that it cannot be concluded
that prosecution is not in the interests of justice where an amnesty has been
granted.
The Rome Statute and the Norms of International Law Do Not
Conclusively Support Amnesties
Article 53 of the Rome Statute does not make reference to international
norms442 and international duties on member states to prosecute are not binding on
the ICC.443 However, the objects of the Rome Statute and international norms and
duties should be taken into account in interpretation of ambiguous treaty
provisions.44 If we apply a purposive approach to the Rome Statute, it serves
three primary goals: to combat impunity by prosecuting individuals for
international crimes, 445 to "prevent governments from shielding perpetrators from
prosecution for political reasons' 446 and, by doing so, "restore and improve
regional peace and security. 447 While the last goal may be perceived as justifying
amnesty where it leads to conflict resolution, the underlying presumption of the
Court is that prosecution in itself contributes to peace and security, apparent in
both states' rejections of immunities for heads of state or persons in official
positions448 and the Security Council's referral of the Darfur situation to the
ICC.44 9 If we will not permit immunities, why then would we permit amnesties?
The mere establishment of the ICC and state ratification contributes to a customary
duty to prosecute because it indicates that "[t]he international community...
440. See Thapelo Sakoana & Richard Mantu, NPA to Prosecute Apartheid-Era Criminals, BUA
NEWS ONLINE, Jan. 24,2006, http://www.buanews.gov.za/news/06/06012416451001.
441. See Trumbull, supra note 179, at 311.
442. See Rome Statute, art. 53(1) (referring to "under this statute"); see also Rome Statute, pmbl
(recalling that it is "the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible
for international crimes").
443. Siebert-Fohr, supra note 3, at 573-74; see also Gavron, supra note 3, at 108.
444. Article 31, 1 and 3 of the Vienna Convention provides that a treaty should be interpreted in
light of its object and purpose, and that regard can be had to any relevant rules of international law
applicable between the parties.
445. Gropengieller & MeiBner, supra note 121, at 181, 183; O'Shea, supra note 11, at 318.
446. Llewellyn, supra note 92, at 204.
447. Ohlin, supra note 36, at 192.
448. Rome Statute, art. 27.
449. Press Release, Security Counsel, Security Counsel Refers Situation in Darfur, Sudan, to
Prosecutor of International Criminal Court, U.N. Press Release SC/8351 (Mar. 31, 2005), available at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sc8351.doc.htm.
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decided that justice, in the form of prosecution, must take priority over peace and
national reconciliation. 450 States' intention to send such a message is apparent in
the preamble, which recalls "it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal
jurisdiction [as understood in relation to admissibility] over those responsible for
,,451international crimes. Moreover, the states intending that justice meant
international justice (i.e. retributive) is indicated in the preambular resolution to
"guarantee lasting respect for and enforcement of international justice. 452
Ratification goes some way in dispelling claims of cultural imperialism.
Despite the Rome Statute's contribution to crystallization of a norm, and
despite customary and treaty based duties to prosecute some serious crimes and
other jus cogens norms, a norm prohibiting or permitting amnesty per se has not
yet crystallized. Except for the SATRC, no state has adopted a conditional amnesty
model with comprehensive criteria; whether a State might be partly dependent on
whether it views amnesty as contrary to international law. Whether it is contrary to
international law brings us back to our original question: is there a prohibition on
amnesty? In regard to member states in particular, we might simply answer this
question by finding that they have irrevocably "conferred the authority to exercise
their criminal jurisdiction to the [ICC] ."4 This has little significance for Sudan,
which is not a member state, but is relevant to Uganda, which invoked jurisdiction
by referral.454 In any event, this leads to the conclusion that the term "justice" has
not yet been broadened as a matter of law by state practice to incorporate peace
building, reconciliation, and reparation. The ICC might assist crystallization of a
norm permitting amnesty if it finds that "justice" incorporates political and social
factors. However, it should not do so for three reasons. First, according to Scharf a
strong argument can be made that the Rome Statute does not incorporate
procedural aspects of the Geneva Conventions or the Genocide Convention that
require prosecution.455 However, it would be incongruous for the Prosecutor to
450. Dugard, supra note 15, at 702; see also Williams & Schabas, supra note 58, at 561.
451. Rome Statute, preamble. While it may be argued that this, in conjunction with other
preambular passages, imposes a duty to prosecute which prevents amnesty, it is inconsistent with the
intention of states entering into the Statute, state practice since its adoption, and article 25 which
provides that "no provision in this Statue relating to individual criminal responsibility shall affect the
responsibility of States under international law." Siebert-Fohr, supra note 3, at 558-59 (quoting Rome
Statute art. 25, 4).
452. Rome Statute, preamble. Colombia's interpretive declaration serves as a counter to this
assertion, however it has no binding effect in relation to other states. United Nations Treaty Collection,
Chapter XVIII Penal Matters, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Declarations and
Reservations, http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsgno=XVIII-10&
chapter- 18&lang=en#EndDec (last visited Jan. 10, 2011).
453. Gropengieler & MeiBner, supra note 121, at 182. Whether States can alter or withdraw their
treaty ratification is linked to whether the Rome Statute itself imposes an obligation on states to
prosecute. This is doubtful; the only reference to state duties is in the preamble. In any event, a
conferral basis wrongly assumes that the jurisdiction of the ICC is absolute.
454. See State Parties to the Rome Statute, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT,
http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2010).
455. Scharf, supra note 58, at 370. For reasons related to selectivity it is not feasible to constrain
amnesties by subject matter.
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apply a more permissive approach than that which states have agreed to,456 or to
override amnesty for crimes where a duty is imposed but not for others where it is
not (i.e. crimes against humanity and war crimes). Even though the ICC applies
complementarity rather than universal jurisdiction, the purpose is to retain the
operation of domestic criminal justice processes where possible, not to limit ICC
jurisdiction with regard to personal or subject matter jurisdiction. Second, if the
ICC determines what is and what is not an appropriate amnesty model, it would in
fact impinge on the role of states that are, as advocates of an expansive approach
might posit, better placed to determine appropriate solutions to conflicts. Third,
any such determination would have adverse legal consequences on state
obligations to prosecute.457 The Court would serve to solidify the law on amnesties
when its permissibility and precise contours are still subject to debate in the
international community and within states. Should states wish to permit an
amnesty model, they ought not to ratify the Rome Statute on the one hand and
argue for crystallization of a norm on the other. They ought, rather, to adopt
explicit provisions which resolve the inter-relationship of the duties to prosecute,
deference to the ICC, and grants of amnesty.
Prosecution by the ICC Facilitates a Comprehensive Approach
The ICC cannot be "a panacea for the world's ills, '458 but neither can truth
commissions nor amnesties. Adopting an expansive approach limits justice for
victims because it excludes retribution. South Africa is a case in point. It is
doubtful that a significant percentage of victims do not want retributive justice as
well as reconciliation and reparation. Defining the interests of justice to exclude
amnesty should not and does not presuppose the exclusion of alternative justice
mechanisms altogether. Rather, it permits a "three pronged approach involving the
ICC... truth commissions," and, where possible, national prosecutions.45 9 The
Prosecutor has recognized that traditional African mechanisms can achieve local
reconciliation and be a complementary tool to the Court's efforts. 460 A multi-
faceted approach facilitates complementarity by punishing perpetrators, promoting
reconciliation, and building a comprehensive picture of the situation.461
Prosecution by the ICC also strengthens the rule of law in national systems by
compelling states to conduct domestic prosecutions, as demonstrated by the
proposal of the Ugandan government to adopt a multi-layered approach involving
prosecutions and traditional justice mechanisms.462 Prosecution also prevents
456. Gropengieller & Mei~ner, supra note 121, at 193-94.
457. Siebert-Fohr, supra note 3, at 563.
458. Sadat, supra note 15, at 1034; see also Blumenson, supra note 179, at 867 ("No mechanism
will ever deliver perfect justice."); Udombana, supra note 154, at 3 ("[I]t is wrong to mistake a
particular medicine - international criminal justice - as the elixir of Africa's many ailments.").
459. MURPHY, supra note 64, at 52; see also Lipscomb, supra note 25, at 186; Rose, supra note
293, at 383; Totten & Tyler, supra note 247, at 1080-81.
460. Press Release, Office of the Prosecutor, Int'l Criminal Court, The Prosecutor of the ICC
Opens Investigations in Darfur, ICC-OTP-0606-104 (2005), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int1NR/exeres/3 1F3684F-43BC-4D5E-9EOA-A6A8DAC308EB.htm.
461. Udombana, supra note 154, at 20-21.
462. Orentlicher, supra note 16, at 2547-48.
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revisionism by state actors463 and ensures that victims' fundamental rights under
international law are not infringed.464
Alternative mechanisms that do not grant amnesty could most clearly operate
concurrently with ICC prosecutions. Amnesty would give rise to uncertainty
regarding whether a perpetrator would in fact benefit from it but, as shall be
discussed below, uncertainty for perpetrators is outweighed by the uncertainty
regarding recidivism.
Deferring to Amnesty Holds the ICC Hostage
If the Prosecutor refrains from prosecuting for political reasons, whether
framed solely in terms of amnesty or premised on facilitating peace negotiations
more generally, the ICC may be "held hostage by the likes of Kony. ' ,465 This might
set a precedent for future indictees because it provides an incentive for leaders
guilty of perpetrating serious crimes to refuse to negotiate peace unless amnesty is
assured. While they may do this in any event, a greater incentive is available
should the possibility of amnesty be made available. This applies equally to
governments negotiating or granting amnesty, because it is seldom the case that
individual actors within government have not committed violations. Relying on the
state in pursuit of culturally specific justice might fail to combat impunity or
ensure lasting peace.
Selectivity
The Prosecutor must assess the interests of justice on a case-by-case
approach;466 a legitimate amnesty in one instance may not be so in another.
Decisions turn on the information and evidence on hand and rely on inextricably
interlinked factual circumstances, such as the granting of amnesty, the role and
number of perpetrators, the number of victims, and whether the country is at the
conflict or post-conflict stage. Moreover, one size does not fit all when considering
the complexity of the "interface of international law and politics. '467 This issue
was central to the inability of states to draft a provision for amnesty in the Rome
Statute.468 States had sympathy for South Africa's position, but were concerned
about decisions not to prosecute by South American dictators.469 If the Prosecutor
engages in an assessment of models, it might give rise to selectivity in application
of an exception to prosecution and to resultant challenges to the ICC's legitimacy.
How would the Prosecutor differentiate between the case studies described? Would
463. Majzub, supra note 42, at 251.
464. Slye, supra note 179, at 191-97. According to Slye, these include the right to justice (defined
as investigation, prosecution and punishment), the right to truth, the right to judicial protection, the right
to reparations and the right to access to a Court. Id.
465. Roth, supra note 41, at 767. This applies to both the Security Council and the Prosecutor.
466. Sadat, supra note 15, at 1028.
467. Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, The International Criminal Court and National Amnesty Laws, 93
AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC 65, 66 (1999).
468. Siebert-Fohr, supra note 3, at 561-62.
469. Williams & Schabas, supra note 58, at 617.
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Ugandan perpetrators be permitted amnesty because they played a lead role in
negotiations and amnesties served as a valuable bargaining tool? Or, despite that
the situation was post-conflict, would South African perpetrators be permitted
amnesty because of the relative merits of a model that facilitated victim
participation and reparations? Deferring to political interests might compromise
the independence of the ICC and politicize the pursuit of international justice
because it would be required to make assessments about the value of one system
over another. 470 If we move from the case studies into an international armed
conflict, these concerns might be further exacerbated where one state grants
amnesty, which is upheld by the Prosecutor, but another other doesn't.
Lack of Empirical Evidence
Kastner submits that one way to determine whether to defer to amnesties is to
hold "individuals accountable [only] 'if the benefits of accountability over the long
term are likely to outweigh the costs on the short term of prolonging an ongoing
conflict.' 471 The problem is one of ascertainment. While there are many situations
in which amnesties have been granted since individual criminal liability was
established as a matter of international law, there have been very few empirical
studies on the long-term impact of amnesties and alternative justice mechanisms. 72
Moreover, there are competing claims regarding whether amnesties or refraining
from prosecution for political reasons lead to peace and reconciliation. In regard to
South Africa, Slye submits that, "even assuming amnesties contribute to short-term
social stability, in the long-term they undercut efforts to establish a stable
democracy that honors human rights and the rule of law" and create a culture of
impunity.473 Contrary to this position, Helena Cobban "concludes that the TRC in
South Africa, granting conditional amnesties, and the absence of any individual
accountability in Mozambique have delivered much better results than, for
instance, international prosecutions in Rwanda., 4 74 Even accepting Cobban's
position, comparing South Africa with Rwanda is like comparing apples and
oranges. To understand the impact of alternative justice mechanisms, long-term
comprehensive and contextual analysis needs to be undertaken. While it is also yet
to be shown whether international prosecutions result in peace and security and
entrenchment of the rule of law, it is difficult to rely on examples like South Africa
to demonstrate amnesties do.
470. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 15, at 89.
471. Kastner, supra note 179, at 151-52.
472. Neil J. Kritz, Coming to Terms with Atrocities: A Review of Accountability Mechanisms for
Mass Violations of Human Rights, 59 LAw & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 127, 144 (1996); Newman,
supra note 6, at 301-02.
473. Slye, supra note 179, at 197.
474. Kastner, supra note 179, at 150 (referring to HELENA COBBAN, AMNESTY AFTER ATROCITY?
HEALING NATIONS AFTER GENOCIDE AND WAR 194 (2007)).
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The Impact of Amnesty and Indictment on the Peace Process
We might argue that amnesty encourages leaders to the negotiating table and
to cease-fire. Archbishop Tutu and others argued that prosecutions in South Africa
would have been sabotaged and would have led to more violence.475 However, if
we look at Sierra Leone and Uganda, this position is not always substantiated over
the short or long term. Sankoh and the RUF returned to violence following grants
of unconditional amnesty, and Kony and other leaders of the LRA didn't come
forward to claim amnesty, even though the law permitted them to do SO. 4 76 In
Uganda, dealing with Kony has been described by Roth as "dealing with a
madman. 477 There is no certainty that such leaders would seize amnesty or cease
violent acts if offered it. The same might be said for indicted Sudanese leaders.
The problem is that trading amnesty for peace is not always so simple. Some
leaders with authority to negotiate don't accept the carrot of amnesty, and some
continue to perpetrate violations despite it. The benefits of amnesty, grassroots
reconciliation, rehabilitation, and reparation might still be realized if prosecution
by the ICC is "sufficiently removed" to enable it to prosecute without disturbing
the internal balance that amnesty may bring.478
What the Sudanese and Ugandan situations show us is that indictment served
to bring leaders to the negotiating table. In Sudan, attempts to negotiate peace in
Darfur had been deferred (with the acceptance of the international community) on
the basis that resolution of the North-South conflict and implementation of its
peace agreement was a necessary prerequisite.479 On the one hand, the position
acknowledged the links between the conflicts by acknowledging that there would
be no resolution in one until the other was resolved. However, at the same time it
served to dissociate the North-South conflict from that in Sudan by failing to
recognize that the conflict in Darfur might serve to destabilize that in the south. In
addition, in order to motivate the international community to act, the indictments
served to provide a compelling incentive for the government to reduce its support
for the Janjaweed.48 ° The indictments further served to isolate rebel groups from
international support and motivate them to negotiate.481 Even the prospect of
prosecuting enemies might in itself motivate leaders to negotiate.482 The Security
Council referral, and subsequent investigation by the Prosecutor, may then have
been a crucial factor in the 2006 peace agreement.
475. Jonathan D. Tepperman, Truth and Consequences, 81 FOREIGN AFF. 128, 134 (2002).
476. Emily E. Bartholomew, Constructing Durable Peace: Lessons from Sierra Leone, 38 CAL. W.
INT'L L.J. 117, 132-33 (2007); Kimberly Hanlon, Peace or Justice: Now that Peace is Being Negotiated
in Uganda, Will the ICC Still Pursue Justice? 14 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 295,296 (2007).
477. Roth, supra note 41, at 767.
478. Gavron, supra note 3, at 116.
479. Kastner, supra note 179, at 178.
480. Id. at 177-78.
481. Id. at 175.
482. Id. at 175-76.
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In Uganda, the indictment of LRA leaders not only drew them to the
negotiating table, but contributed to a decrease in crime. 4 83 While there were a
number of factors that led to Kony's involvement in negotiation, the ICC served a
useful role by de-legitimizing the LRA. Subsequently, it less frequently "ran off [to
hide] in a game reserve in north-eastern Congo. 484 Moreover, it might serve to
strengthen the domestic rule of law. As noted, the Ugandan government has sought
the withdrawal of ICC indictments on the basis of admissibility; it proposes to
conduct domestic criminal prosecutions of, at least, those most responsible.485
Representatives of Kony and the LRA have agreed to participate.486 The
indictment of leaders may, if domestic processes operate in accordance with the
requirements of admissibility, serve to "augment the number of national
prosecutions in the future '487 and meet the goals of complementarity.488
While the ability of international prosecutions to have any significant
deterrent effect is doubted, if the ICC upholds grants of amnesty for those most
responsible, any deterrent effect would be reduced. One can only hope that
"political and military leaders will be more careful in their decisions once the




The case studies demonstrate the inordinate complexity involved in conflict,
amnesty, and international prosecutions. In Sudan, the periphery-centre divide is
complicated by a one-party system, oil revenues, Sudan's geographic expanse,
shifting loyalties between rebel groups, the Janjaweed, the PDF, and government
institutions and authorities, and cross-border disputes with Chad.49 ° In Uganda,
Kony's attempts to evade prosecution and peace by entering negotiations only
when necessary to buy time,491 and the LRA's attacks on Ugandan and Congolese
civilians and retreat to the DRC,492 make it difficult to ascertain their movements,
intentions, and sincerity. Even if the Prosecutor deferred to amnesty only for those
less responsible 493 for atrocities, or for those with less negotiating power,
differentiating between those with de jure and de facto power is an impossible task
483. See the discussion on pages 139-142 herein.
484. Roth, supra note 41, at 765-66.
485. Id. at 775-76.
486. Id. at 766.
487. Kastner, supra note 179, at 154.
488. The Security Council reiterated this goal in Resolution 1593 when it called on states to support
domestic efforts to establish the rule of law. S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005)
[hereinafter Resolution 1593].
489. Kastner, supra note 179, at 154.
490. Cash, supra note 252, at 575; Kastner, supra note 179, at 163-64; Nouwen, supra note 269, at
116-18.
491. Katy Glassborow, LRA on Rampage in Congo, HuM. RTS. TRIB., Oct. 30, 2008,
http://www.humanrights-geneva.info/spip.php?article3662.
492. Id.
493. Despite the complexities in the South African and Sierra Leonean conflicts, they both
envisaged prosecution of those most responsible (only by default in the former case).
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when low level perpetrators wield the power to wage violence even if they don't
have the authority to negotiate peace.494 Establishing whether amnesty will serve
the interests of justice in these contexts would therefore be extremely difficult, if
not impossible.
Collective vs. Individual Justice: the Security Council and Functional
Limitations
It is difficult to dismiss political considerations entirely given the Security
Council's residual role in the ICC Statute and the inherent interplay of law and
politics in international law. However, the temporal restriction on Security Council
deferrals indicates that politics, ever-changing, are not a permanently
determinative factor,495 the appropriate body to determine the impact of politics is
the Security Council, and the Prosecutor retains an ultimate discretion in respect to
all other issues.496 We might nevertheless consider three different scenarios: (1)
where the Security Council referred the situation to the ICC; (2) where the state
referred the situation; and (3) where the Prosecutor commenced an investigated
propio motu.
In discussing whether the Prosecutor could determine that an investigation
was not warranted despite the Security Council's referral of the situation in Darfur,
Ohlin puts forward a cogent basis for rejecting amnesty under the first scenario:
If one takes the legal basis for such referrals seriously - i.e. one thinks
of Chapter VII authority as something more than just an excuse or legal
fiction to make such pronouncements - then the Security Council's
actions would seem to allow less room for prosecutorial discretion than
the Assembly of State Parties had initially anticipated. Indeed, however
one wishes to conceive of prosecutorial discretion, it cannot be
interpreted in such a way that the prosecutor has the power to ignore
judgments made by the Security Council - a power that no one has
under international law.
497
Referral presupposed the question of peace and justice; they were assumed to
go hand in hand.498 The logical conclusion is that the ICC does not have the power
to make determinations about collective peace and security itself. The Security
494. See Newman, supra note 6, at 305.
495. Moreover, the politics of conflict resolution becomes the politics of dominant powers in the
Security Council.
496. Han, supra note 119, at 101. The proposal at the Rome Conference to constrain the
Prosecutor's discretion through the Security Council was defeated. Alexander K. A. Greenawalt, Justice
with Politics? Prosecutorial Discretion and the International Criminal Court, 39 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. &
POL. 583, 585 (2007).
497. Ohlin, supra note 36, at 191.
498. The Prosecutor stated that the Darfur situation was referred to him because, in "adopting
resolution 1593 (2005), the Security Council had affirmed that justice and accountability were critical to
achieving lasting peace and security in Darfur." Press Release, Security Council, International Criminal
Court Prosecutor Briefs Security Council on Darfur, Says Will Not Draw Conclusions on Genocide
Until Investigation Complete, U.N. Press Release SC/8748 (Jun. 15, 2006).
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Council seeks peace and security as a collective action,499 whereas the Prosecutor
considers the interests of justice in individual cases. Limiting the Prosecutor to
considerations of individual justice is appropriate given the converse limitations on
the Security Council, which can refer a situation, but has limited authority to
restrain the Court in individual matters.500 In referring Darfur to the Prosecutor, the
Security Council acted pursuant to its authority to make determinations regarding
peace and security. 0 1 Consequently, the Prosecutor should be restricted to a range
of factors relevant to the individual case, rather than the broader impact on
peace.50 2 Collective assessments by the Prosecutor would undermine the
international constitutional order and possibly destabilize the peace process.
By default, the remaining two scenarios are answered because it will never be
within the Prosecutor's scope to determine threats to peace and security. In any
case, where a state refers a situation, it is difficult to conclude other than that the
state itself is competent to determine such issues and that its referral impliedly
rejects amnesty. While the Ugandan government sought the withdrawal of ICC
indictments post-referral because they are purportedly hampering peace
negotiations, it did not do so because it seeks to uphold amnesty, but on the basis
that it would conduct domestic trials.50 3
Regime Change
One of the ways in which prosecution contributes to peace and security is by
preventing those responsible for serious crimes from committing them, and by
criminalizing actors, groups, or regimes. The symbolic act of criminalization may
pressure the international community, governments, and other groups such as
civilians from supporting perpetrators. According to Udombana, "[h]istory has
shown that the involvement of highly placed functionaries or officials of states
makes the commission of most international crimes possible; it is great men,
potential saints, not little men, who become merciless fanatics. 50 4 In Uganda,
Kony's removal is a vital step in making the LRA ineffective, as he "stands at the
apex of the LRA structure, politically, militarily, and spiritually. 50 5 The situation
in Sudan is more complicated because instability in Darfur serves to entrench al-
Bashir and other government leaders' positions by preventing a unified front in the
region.50 6 If those indicted were arrested and successfully prosecuted, it is possible
499. Ohlin, supra note 36, at 191, 196.
500. See Douglas Eisner, Note, Humanitarian Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era, 11 B.U. INT'L
L.J. 195, 198 (1993). Despite the United States expectation that "the Council will continue to exercise
such oversight as investigations and prosecutions pursuant to the referral proceed." Quoted (but not
referenced) in Happold, supra note 230, at 234.
501. With the exception that the Pre-Trial Chamber can determine whether the Security Council
acted lawfully.
502. Ohlin, supra note 36, at 207.
503. See Justin Coleman, Comment, Showing Its Teeth: The International Criminal Court Takes on
Child Conscription in the Congo, but Is Its Bark Worse Than Its Bite?, 26 PENN ST. INT'L L. REv. 765,
782-83 (2008).
504. Udombana, supra note 154, at 44.
505. Akhavan, supra note 155, at 420.
506. Kastner, supra note 179, at 169.
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that a regime change (and possible international intervention) could reduce crime
and stabilize the region. 507
Indictment by the ICC may nevertheless have the opposite effect. While
indictments, arrest warrants, and consequent international attention regarding the
Darfur crisis purportedly reduced Sudanese government support for the
Janjaweed, 50 8 they also served to strengthen support for al-Bashir within the
country and within regional blocks or alliances. 0 9 Since issuance of the arrest
warrant, al-Bashir has visited up to half a dozen countries within the region.510
Nevertheless, indictment might have the adverse effect of ensuring that indictees
will do everything to hold on to power by committing more serious crimes and
impeding the investigation and prosecution. In any event, the extent to which
prosecutions could facilitate regime change and conflict resolution would be
hampered where removal from office simply creates space for individuals who
may also perpetrate crime.
What this tells us though, is not that we must uphold amnesty (because it will
have no impact on regime or institutional change anyway), but that there are
broader constitutional and finctional problems with international law, which the
ICC should not attempt to resolve. Akhavan aptly states:
The view that dialogue with fanatical murderous leaders would
somehow lead to a peaceful settlement is a chimera, often encouraged
by an international community that is eager to insulate itself from
genuine engagement in putting an end to the atrocities. As one observer
concluded, Kony's "refusal for years to accept olive branches and huge
concessions including total amnesty... indicate his mental incapacity."....
But even if Kony proves to be willing and able to negotiate when
presented with the right incentives, the best means of ensuring such a
negotiation appears to be sustained military and political pressure. In
this respect, peace and justice are by no means mutually exclusive."
511
That a state engages with leaders despite their unwillingness to refrain from
violence is linked to the international community's reluctance "to use force to
topple a rogue regime."'5 12 In an ideal world, the ICC would be supported by
economic sanctions, and arms embargoes,513 and possibly even an obligatory norm
507. Id.
508. Id. at 165.
509. See A1-Bashir Concludes Eritrea Visit, ALJAZEERA, Mar. 24, 2009,
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2009/03/26/rightsgroups lash out at bashirs visit to egypt/9028/; Sudanese Media Advertise
Bashir's Visit to Ethiopia, SUDAN TRIB., Apr. 20, 2009, http://www.sudantribune.com/
spip.php?article30941.
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to intervene on humanitarian grounds pursuant to the responsibility to protect. On a
smaller scale, the investigation and prosecution of al-Bashir and other leaders
would have been buttressed by a further resolution calling on states to cooperate
with the ICC. That the Security Council doesn't adopt complementary measures is
a consequence of the freedom to act (or not to act) under its constitution, i.e. the
veto power of states such as the United States, China, and Russia, with economic,
ideological and political interests to protect.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Prosecutor of the ICC has adopted the correct approach to admissibility
and the interests of justice. Amnesties granted by truth commissions do not satisfy
the terms of admissibility under article 17 of the Rome Statute when interpreted in
light of the Statute's objects and purposes. An expansive interpretation of the
interests of justice, incorporating political and social factors underpinning grants of
amnesty, is inconsistent with states' intention in enacting the Rome Statute.
Moreover, it is undesirable and impractical given the position of amnesties in
international law, the complexity of both internal and international conflicts and
associated peace negotiations (even at the post-conflict stage), and the retention of
Security Council authority over international peace and justice.5 14 The Pre-Trial
Chamber is not best placed to determine or define an international norm regarding
conditional amnesties, which it would inevitably do if it makes judicial
determinations regarding whether the amnesties are in the interests of justice. The
role of the Prosecutor is to determine whether the interests of justice are served, by
considering factors such as whether the victims have access to some form of
justice, whether the perpetrator is a low-level offender who has committed a small
number of violations, and whether investigation and prosecution of the matter will
extract evidence which might be useful in cases against more senior figures. The
Pre-Trial Chamber's role is to determine whether the Prosecutor has exercised his
role in an appropriate manner, and to apply the law to the exclusion of global,
regional, or domestic politics. Where the Security Council does intervene on the
basis of amnesty, the Pre-Trial Chamber may only engage in judicial review of a
resolution to the extent that it complies with Article 16 of the Rome Statute, such
as to determine whether it constitutes "an abuse of authority.., or [an] obvious and
grave deficiency." '5 15 This approach allows States to engage in actions that lead to
the development of a treaty or customary norm regarding alternative justice
mechanisms and their reconciliatory and reparatory functions, and how, or even
whether, amnesties might feature in restoration; such States being best placed to do
SO.
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